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THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE LIMITS
OF ANTITRUST
THOMAS

A.

LAMBERT*

Abstract. Numerous commentators have characterized the Roberts Court's
antitrust decisions as radical departures that betray a pro-business, anticonsumer bias. That characterization is inaccurate. Although some of the
decisions do represent significant changes from past practice, the "probusiness/anti-consumer" characterization fails to appreciate the fundamental limits of antitrust, a body of law that requires judges and juries to
make fine distinctions between procompetitive and anticompetitive behaviors that frequently resemble each other. Although false acquittals of anticompetitive conduct may harm consumers, so may false convictions of
procompetitive actions. And efforts to eliminate errors in liability judgments are themselves costly. Optimal antitrust rules will aim to minimize
the sum of decision costs (the costs of reaching a liability decision) and
expected error costs (the social losses from false convictions and false acquittals). Each of the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions can be defended
in light of this "decision-theoretic" approach, an approach calculated to
maximize the effectiveness of the antitrust enterprise, to the ultimate benefit of consumers. This Article first describes the fundamental limits of antitrust and the decision-theoretic approach such limits inspire. The Article
then analyzes the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions, explaining how each
coheres with the decision-theoretic model. Finally, the Article predicts how
the Court will address three issues likely to come before it in the future: tying, loyalty rebates, and bundled discounts.
INTRODUCTION

One often hears two things about the Roberts Court's treatment of
antitrust. The first is that this Court has displayed a greater interest in
antitrust than its direct predecessor.' That seems accurate. Whereas the
* @ 2011, Thomas A. Lambert, Associate Professor, University of Missouri Law School.
For helpful comments, I thank Jonathan Adler, Brian Fitzpatrick, Michael Greve, Joshua
Wright, David Zaring, and other participants at the Center for Business Law and Regulation Conference on Business Law in the Roberts Court. Thanks to Ian Larson for excellent
research assistance.
I See Einer Elhauge, Harvard,Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent US. Suprelne Court Decisions?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007, 59, 60 ("After a long antitrust slumber, the U.S. Supreme Court has become active again in antitrust law, deciding
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Rehnquist Court showed little enthusiasm for antitrust cases in its later
years, the Roberts Court issued seven antitrust decisions in its first two
years alone.2 Some have attributed the trend toward more antitrust cases, and more business cases generally, to ChiefJustice Roberts's years in
private practice, during which he confronted a number of business and
antitrust issues. 3 Whatever its cause, there does seem to be an uptick in
enthusiasm for antitrust cases on the current Supreme Court.
The second oft-heard observation about the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions is that they betray a significant pro-business (or, pejoratively, anti-consumer) shift on the Court. Not surprisingly, left-leaning
advocacy groups have repeatedly sounded this refrain.4 But even respected academics and leaders of the antitrust bar have construed the
Roberts Court's antitrust decisions as being radically and reflexively probusiness.5 For example, noted legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky recently
dubbed the Roberts Court "the most pro-business Supreme Court there
has been since the mid-1930s" and has characterized the Court's antitrust decisions as "favoring business over consumers." 6 Chemerinsky, by
seven cases in the last two years."); Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School
of Antitrust Analysis: The 2006 Term and Beyond, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007,
24, 25 ("The antitrust activity level of the Roberts Court thus far has exceeded the single
case average of the Court prior to the 2003-2004 Term by a significant margin.").
2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 6
(2005). The Rehnquist Court decided one antitrust case from 1993 to 1995, one each year
from 1996 through 1999, and none from 2000 to 2003; the Roberts Court decided seven
cases from 2006 to 2007. See id.; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267-68 (2007); Bell
Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
28, 31 (2006); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v.
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 182 (2006).
See David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of
Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1019, 1055 & n.205 (2009)
("Chief Justice Roberts's near-decade in private practice no doubt attuned him to the interests of the corporate bar.").
4 See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, UNPRECEDENTED INJUSTICE: THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF
THE ROBERTS COURT 3, available at http://www.afj.org/judicial-selection/unprecedentedinjustice.pdf (construing the Court's Leegin decision as holding "that manufacturers and
retailers of consumer goods could engage in price-fixing").
5 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2007 Supreme Court Term, 25
ToURO L. REV. 541, 545 (2009).
6 Id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court: Sharp Turn to the Right, CAL. B.J. (Aug.

2007), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/Archive.aspx?month=8&year= 2007 (follow hyperlink
bearing web page title). Chemerinsky highlights three decisions that, he says, favored
business over consumers. He writes:
In several cases, the Court made it much more difficult to sue business for antitrust violations. In Leegin Creative Leather ProductsInc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Court
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his own admission, is not an antitrust expert.7 The meme he recites has
nevertheless been embraced by others who do have substantial antitrust
expertise. For example, William Kolasky, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and an associate editor of the American Bar Association's Antitrust
magazine, made the following observations in 2008:
Our Supreme Court, especially under the leadership of Chief
Justice John Roberts, seems equally intent on cutting back on
private enforcement. It has been more than fifteen years since
the Supreme Court last decided an antitrust case in favor of a
plaintiff. Over this fifteen-year period, plaintiffs have gone 0for-16, with not a single plaintiff winning an antitrust case m
the Supreme Court since the first George Bush was president.
This record led Antitrust to ask in its last issue whether the Supreme Court's recent antitrust decisions represent 'The End
of Antitrust as We Know It?" 8
The central claim of this Article is that the second common assertion about the Roberts Court's antitrust jurisprudence-that it is probusiness and anti-consumer and represents a radical departure from
the past-is wrong and reflects a misunderstanding of the antitrust enterprise. As a body of law regulating business conduct for the benefit of
consumers, antitrust is inherently limited. Once one accounts for the
limits of antitrust, the rulings of the Roberts Court, rather than "favoring business over consumers," seem calculated to maximize antitrust's
effectiveness to the ultimate benefit of consumers. Specifically, the Roboverruled a 96-year-old decision and held that it is not a per se violation of
antitrust laws for a manufacturer to set minimum resale prices. In Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, the Court ruled that there cannot be antitrust
claims for securities law violations. The court explained that securities laws
were "clearly incompatible" with antitrust laws, such that securities law implicitly precluded antitrust claims. And in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court
held that stating a claim under the Sherman Act's restraint of trade provision
requires that the complaint allege sufficient facts to suggest that an agreement was made. The Court rejected notice pleading for such claims, thus
making it harder for plaintiff to get into court.
Chemerinsky, supra (citations omitted).
7 Dale Carpenter, AALS Mid-Year Meeting: The Changing Roberts Court, THE VOLOKH CONspIRAcY (June 4, 2008, 2:03 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/06/04/aals-mid-year-meetingthe-changing-roberts-court/ (reporting that Chemerinsky "admitted he 'know[s] nothing
about'" antitrust).
8 William Kolasky, ReinvigoratingAntitrust Enforcement in the United States: A Proposal,22
ANTITRUST 85, 86 (2008).
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erts Court's antitrust cases embrace a decision-theoretic approach that
seeks to minimize the sum of the decision and error costs that inevitably result from antitrust adjudication.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth the limits of antitrust and explains how a decision-theoretic approach, in light of these
inherent limits, ultimately benefits consumers by maximizing the overall
effectiveness of the antitrust enterprise.9 Part II then discusses the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions, demonstrating how each coheres with a
decision-theoretic approach.1o Part III looks to the future and predicts
how the Roberts Court, harnessing the insights of decision theory, will
resolve several antitrust issues that are likely to come before it.11

1.

THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST AND THE NEED FOR A DECISIONTHEORETIC APPROACH

When it comes to ensuring that consumers have access to low prices, high quality goods, and product variety, there is no better regulator
than competition. Antitrust thus aims to ensure that markets remain as
competitive as possible. 12 That does not mean, though, that antitrust
should be singularly focused on ensuring that markets include large
numbers of competitors.13 In many markets, output will be higher and
prices lower if producers are allowed to exploit economies of scale by
growing quite large-so large that only a handful of producers, operating at "minimum efficient scale" (the point beyond which an increase in
output does not reduce per unit costs), are able to supply the entire
market.' 4 In such markets, output would be impeded and prices would
rise if the law broke large, efficient producers into smaller, less efficient
ones.15 It thus makes sense to adopt an output-focused understanding of
competition, where markets are deemed more competitive when they
produce more of what consumers want, and at lower prices, and less

9 See infra notes 12-40 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 41-324 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 325-376 and accompanying text.
12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 2.
13 See id.
14 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 27-29 (3d ed. 2005).
15 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 112 (2d ed. 2001) ("[D]econcentration

might impose heavy costs on society by requiring industries to operate with higher costs
than before they had been deconcentrated.").
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competitive when they produce less, and at higher prices. 16 The ultimate
objective of antitrust is to maximize competition, so understood.
Speaking in the most general of terms, antitrust pursues this overarching goal by policing the situations in which competition breaks
down, most notably monopoly (or monopsony), where there is a single
seller (or buyer), and collusion, where nominal competitors agree not
to compete.1 7 The two primary provisions of the Sherman Act correspond to these two paradigmatic defects in competition.1 8 Section 1
aims at collusion, proclaiming that "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce . . . is declared to be illegal."19 Section 2 seeks to prevent

firms from attaining monopoly power, making it illegal to "monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monopolize"

any market.2 0
From the very beginning, these statutory texts have created problems for judges. Read literally, section 1 is so broad as to be nonsensical,
for every executory contract restrains trade; when I promise to sell
something to you, I "restrain" myself from "trading" that item with another.2 ' Accordingly, the Court early on interpreted section 1 to forbid
only unreasonable restraints of trade, requiring lower courts to grapple
with the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints.22
Section 2 poses interpretive difficulties because neither the Sherman
Act nor the common law at the time of the Act's passage ever defined
the term "monopolize."23 The Court eventually ruled that monopolization consists of possessing some amount of market power and engaging
in exclusionary conduct, but many pro-consumer acts (e.g., price cuts
and product improvements) win business for the actor and thus tend to
exclude rivals, and neither the Court nor antitrust commentators have
been able to specify what exactly renders an act "unreasonably" exclu16 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 2-5 (describing an output-focused understanding
of competition).
17 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 11-19.
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
19 Id. § 1.
20 Id. § 2.
21 See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (reasoning that the term
restraint of trade" in section 1 cannot possibly refer to any restraint on competition because "[elvery agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains" and because "[t]o bind, to restrain, is of their very essence").
22 Id. ("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition.").
23 See HOVENKAMP, supranote 14, at 53.
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sionary.24 Thus, every time a court confronts an antitrust challenge to a
novel business practice, it must make a judgment about the overall desirability of the practice at issue (e.g., Does it constitute an "unreasonable" restraint of trade? Is it "unreasonably" exclusionary?).
The enforcement provisions of the antitrust laws ensure that
courts are routinely called upon to make these sorts of judgments in
lawsuits by private plaintiffs. The Clayton Act provides that "any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws" may bring a lawsuit in federal court.2 5
To account for the fact that many antitrust violations occur in secret
and thus escape condemnation, the statute seeks to optimize the deterrent effect of private enforcement by permitting each successful plaintiff to "recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 26 What we end up with,
then, is a body of law that is ultimately aimed at maximizing competition (understood in terms of market output), is quite general in its literal proscriptions, becomes "fleshed out" by generalist courts adjudicating private disputes, and is highly attractive to private plaintiffs seeking
super-compensatory recoveries.
Taken together, these aspects of American antitrust law-all of
which predate the Roberts Court by decades-render antitrust adjudication an inherently limited enterprise. In most challenges to novel business practices (and the prospect of treble damages guarantees that there
will be many such challenges), whether liability is appropriate will be
difficult to determine. Challenges to concerted conduct are frequently
perplexing because a great many, perhaps most, output-enhancing
business innovations involve cooperation among independent eco24 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Thomas A. Lambert, Weyerhaeuser and the Search for Antitrust's Holy Grail, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 277,
299-312 (describing competing attempts to specify a unitary test for identifying instances
of unreasonably exclusionary conduct).
25 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). Note that a number of Supreme Court decisions have foreclosed a literal reading of this right to sue by "any person who shall be injured" by an antitrust violation. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 526-29 (1983) (outlining the inquiry required beyond mere "reference to the
broad language of § 4," including evaluation of the alleged injury); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977) (explaining that the class of potential enforcers has been
substantially limited by the indirect purchaser rule); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (explaining the more nuanced injury required in antitrust cases).
26 15 U.S.C. § 15; see HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 66-67 (discussing the theoretical rationale for treble damages); see also POSNER, supra note 15, at 271-73 (acknowledging the
historical use of treble damages, but critiquing their appropriateness across the board).
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nomic actors, frequently competitors.2 7 Challenges to unilateral conduct
that may enhance market power are often hard to resolve because all
actions that help a seller win business from its rivals-even proconsumer actions like most price cuts-technically "exclude" those rivals.2 8 Distinguishing output-reducing collusion from output-enhancing
coordination (in section 1 cases) and unreasonable from reasonable
exclusionary acts (in section 2 cases) can be exceedingly difficult.29 To
draw the necessary distinctions, judges and juries usually must weigh
conflicting testimony from economic experts and reach conclusions on
a number of complex subsidiary issues, such as the contours of the relevant market, the existence and magnitude of entry barriers, and the
elasticity of demand and/or supply for the product at issue.
Antitrust adjudication is thus exceedingly, and inevitably, costly.30
Most obviously, there are significant costs involved in simply reaching a
decision. The parties themselves, with the aid of lawyers and, in most
cases, economic experts, must gather, process, and present a large
amount of complex data.31 The fact finder must then deliberate over
the information presented and reach conclusions on both subsidiary
issues (e.g., the contours of the relevant market) and the outcomedeterminative question (e.g., whether the challenged trade restraint is
"unreasonable" because it reduces overall market output).32 Taken together, these costs constitute the decision costs of an antitrust adjudication.
But those are not the only relevant costs. Given the complexity of
the issues presented in antitrust cases, mistakes are inevitable, and
those mistakes will themselves impose costs. On the one hand, when a
fact finder wrongly acquits an anticompetitive practice, market power is
created or enhanced, causing loss in the form of allocative inefficiency;
27 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1984) (observing that practically all output-enhancing economic activities involve extensive coordination among independent economic actors, many of whom could be competitors).
28 See Lambert, supra note 24, at 278-79.
2 See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 26 (observing that competitive and exclusionary
conduct look alike); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1696, 1710 (1986) ("[I t is almost impossible to distinguish exclusion from hard competition."). It can also be quite difficult to distinguish concerted from unilateral conduct. See
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 224-27 (1939). And, because the Sherman
Act itself draws a distinction between such types of conduct and posits different legal tests for
evaluating the legality of each, the distinction matters. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
s0 Easterbrook, supranote 27, at 4.
21 Id. at 4-5.
32 Id. at 9-14.
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consumers are injured because output is lower and prices higher than
they otherwise would be.33 On the other hand, when a fact finder
wrongly convicts a practice that is, in fact, output-enhancing, the market is denied the greater output (and lower prices) that practice would
have produced, and a productive inefficiency results. Again, consumers
are injured by reduced output, less product variety and innovation, and
higher prices. Taken together, the productive inefficiencies spawned by
false positives (hereinafter "Type I errors") and the allocative inefficiencies resulting from false negatives (hereinafter "Type II errors")
constitute the error costs of antitrust adjudication. As explained below,
there are good reasons to believe that the costs of false positives will
exceed those of false negatives. 34 But, for present purposes, the important point to see is that antitrust adjudication will inevitably involve
some mistakes, and those mistakes-be they false acquittals or false
convictions-will impose social costs. 35
The decision costs and error costs associated with antitrust adjudication, costs that are simply unavoidable under our antitrust laws as
drafted, constitute the limits of antitrust.36 Those limits are inexorable.
Courts cannot streamline the required factual inquiry, so as to lower
decision costs, without raising error costs. They cannot reduce the error
costs associated with false negatives (by, for example, easing a plaintiffs
prima facie proof burden or increasing the difficulty of establishing an
affirmative defense) without increasing the error costs associated with
false positives. They cannot reduce the error costs associated with false
positives (by, for example, raising a plaintiffs prima facie proof requirements or easing the burden of establishing an affirmative defense)
without increasing the error costs associated with false negatives. Legal
changes to reduce one set of costs tend to enhance another.
Given this unhappy situation, courts seeking to maximize antitrust's effectiveness, to the ultimate benefit of consumers, should pur3s See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 19-26 (explaining how market power generates
social losses).
3 See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 2-3; infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. The
result of false negatives, an increase in market power, tends to be self correcting, whereas
false positives, which wrongly condemn not only the defendant's specific conduct but also
all other instances of such conduct, can be corrected only by a subsequent court decision
or a statutory override. See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 2-3; infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
3 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 19-26.
36 Id. at 4 ("Antitrust is costly. The judges act with imperfect information about the ef-

fects of the practices at stake. The costs of action and information are the limits of antitrust.").
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sue a simple strategy: craft antitrust rules and standards so as to minimize the sum of decision and error costs. This is the approach prescribed by decision theory, which "sets out a process for making factual
determinations and decisions when information is costly and therefore
imperfect."3 7 As stated above, error costs in antitrust adjudication are
the allocative inefficiencies that result from wrongly permitting instances of market power-enhancing practices (the costs of false acquittals) and the productive efficiency losses that result from improperly
deterring output-enhancing practices (the costs of false convictions).38
Error costs are therefore a function of the probability that a proffered
rule will lead to an incorrect judgment and the magnitude of loss that
will result from that type of error.3 9 Decision costs are a function of the
liability rule's informational requirements and the ease with which it
can be applied. A decision-theoretic approach to antitrust adjudication
must therefore account for (1) the likelihood that the liability rule at
issue will produce an incorrect judgment, (2) the magnitude of losses
from the various errors the rule might generate, and (3) the difficulty
of administering the rule.
As the following Part shows, all the antitrust decisions the Roberts
Court has thus far rendered can be defended in light of decision theory's instruction to craft legal rules so as to minimize the sum of decision and error costs. 40 They therefore represent an optimal-and ultimately consumer-friendly-response to the limits of antitrust.
II.

DECISION THEORY AND THE ROBERTS COURT'S ANTITRUST
DECISIONS

In considering how the Roberts Court's antitrust jurisprudence
reflects a decision-theoretic approach to antitrust adjudication, it is
helpful to divide the Court's antitrust decisions into two groups: those
concerning substantive liability rules and those concerning procedures
and immunities. The former category includes the Court's decisions in
the following cases: Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. in
2007, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. in 2007, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communications, Inc. in 2009, and lliC. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67
41, 41 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
3 See id. at 45; supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
3
See id. at 61-62. If P = probability of an error and M = the expected magnitude of
loss from that sort of error, then error costs =[
ase positive X Mfwis positive) + Palse negative X
3

ANTITRUST L.J.

Ma,-

negative)]. See id.
4

See infra notes 41-324 and accompanying text.
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nois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. in 2006.41 The latter includes
the Court's decisions in three other cases: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
in 2007, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing in 2007, and American
Needle, Inc. v. NFL in 2010.42 This Article will not discuss the Court's
2006 decision in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC,
Inc.4 3 Although that decision technically involved a dispute under the
antitrust laws, the provision at issue, the Robinson-Patman Act, is expressly not focused on consumer welfare and is thus not readily amenable to the decision-theoretic approach."
A. Decisions ConcerningSubstantive Liability Rules
1. Leegin and Minimum Resale Price Maintenance
Of the Roberts Court's substantive antitrust decisions, the one that
has received the most criticism (at least among the popular press) for
being pro-business, anti-consumer, and "radical" is Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which held that instances of minimum resale
price maintenance ("RPM") are not per se illegal but must be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis under antitrust's rule of reason.45 One columnist
from the Baltimore Sun criticized Leegin, predicting that the "[e]lectronic
bargains of today will be gone by this time next year" and stating that
"for that you can thank that radical activist Gang of Five on the U.S. Supreme Court," which "slipped through a decision that overturned 96
years of antitrust law."46 As those remarks suggest, the perception that
41 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115 (2009); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep.
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
42 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216-17 (2010); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA)
LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267-68 (2007); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549
(2007).
43
Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006).
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006); HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 579 ("[T]he RobinsonPatman Act cannot be understood as designed to encourage allocative efficiency or to
maximize consumer welfare. It was designed to protect small businesses from larger, more
efficient businesses.").
45 551 U.S. at 886-87. Minimum RPM (unless otherwise specified, this Article uses the
terms "minimum RPM" and "RPM" interchangeably) occurs when an upstream seller (e.g.,
a manufacturer) sets the minimum price that a downstream seller (e.g., a retailer) may
charge for the upstream seller's product. See Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now
What?: Structuring a Rule of Reasonfor EvaluatingMinimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 1937, 1940 n.3 (2009).
4 Mike Himowitz, Electronic Bargains of Today Will Be Gone by this Time Next Year, BALT.
SUN, July 5, 2007, at 7D.
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Leegin represents a radical, pro-business/anti-consumer shift stems from
the facts that (1) it overruled a long-standing precedent (the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the 1911 case of Dr.Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co. decision had declared minimum resale price maintenance to be per se illegal); (2) it was a 5-4 decision that pitted the
Court's traditional "conservatives" (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
Roberts, and Alito) against its traditional "liberals" (Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); and (3) it permitted the imposition of
price floors, which one would expect to raise consumer prices. 47
In contrast to its characterization in the popular press, however,
Leegin was not particularly controversial among mainstream antitrust
scholars. For example, Harvard Law School's Einer Elhauge, who
chaired the Obama campaign's Antitrust Advisory Committee, recently
advocated a highly restrictive approach to regulating tying and bundled
discounts, and is no sense a "conservative" on antitrust issues, 48 praises
the Leegin holding and characterizes it as reflecting a consensus view
among the leading schools of antitrust analysis.49 As he observes, the
facts that Leegin overturned a ninety-six-year-old precedent and was decided 5-4 are not really troubling at all. Deference to precedent is less
important, and less expected, in antitrust cases than in other statutory
cases, for courts have long viewed the Sherman Act's broad, amorphous
text as a delegation to craft a quasi-common law reflecting the everexpanding insights of economics.5 0 Economic thinking on RPM has
evolved dramatically since Dr.Miles was decided in 1911.51 Therefore it
4 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887-95; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373, 400 (1911).
4 Einer R. Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REv. 397, 400 (2009); see ProfessorEiner R. Elhauge, HARV. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/eIhauge/bio.php (last modified Apr. 2, 2010).
4 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 60 ("If anything was a topic of consensus among the Harvard and Chicago schools, it was the proposition that this rule of per se illegality [for minimum resale price maintenance] was misguided.").
5o Id. at 61-62 ("[T]he text of the U.S. Sherman Act incorporates capacious common
law language that has long been thought to effectively delegate antitrust issues to the
Courts for ongoing common law resolution. As a matter of practice, the Court, in fact,
overrules antitrust decisions in common law fashion all the time." (internal citations omitted)); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As a
charter of freedom, the [Sherman] [A]ct has a generality and adaptability comparable to
that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.").
51 Most notably, economists have recognized that RPM may offer substantial procompetitive benefits. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisitesand Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 825, 825 (1955); David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls with Uncertain
Demand, 40 J.L. & ECON. 433, 434-36 (1997); Raymond Deneckere et al., Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 619,
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is entirely appropriate that the substantive antitrust rules evolve accordingly.5 2
As for the four-justice dissent, which was authored by Justice Breyer, a former antitrust professor who was certainly aware of the consensus to which Elhauge refers, a careful reading suggests that the dissenters were more concerned with cementing the notion of "superprecedent," a key concept for defenders of the prevailing Supreme
Court case law on abortion rights, than with contesting the actual majority holding.5 3 If one focuses solely on the antitrust issues presented
in the case, Leegin is far less controversial than the Court's 5-4 vote
would suggest.
The third "troubling" fact about Leegin, that it sanctions manufacturer-imposed price floors that are likely to raise consumer prices, still
remains. 54 When viewed through the lens of decision theory, though,

619-21 (1997); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266-67 (1988); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 346-47
(1984); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 28J.L. & ECON. 363, 363-64 (1985); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want
Fair Trade?, 3J.L. & ECON. 86, 87-88 (1960).
52 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 118-19. Indeed, invoking precedent as a basis for
refusing to move from per se illegality to rule of reason treatment would create an odd and
indefensible asymmetry. The usual practice is to evaluate a business practice under the
rule of reason unless and until courts have attained sufficient experience with the practice
to know that it is always or almost always anticompetitive, in which case the law should
evolve so that the practice at issue is per se illegal. See id. at 117-19. Permitting the law to
evolve (in response to economic learning) toward per se illegality, but refusing, on
grounds of precedent, to permit a learning-inspired evolution from per se illegality to rule
of reason treatment would create an unfortunate "ratchet" effect and would render antitrust a less economically defensible enterprise. See id.; Thomas A. Lambert, Antitrust Superprecedent, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Jan. 17, 2007), http://truthonthemarket.com/2007/
01/17/antitrust-superprecedent/.
53See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 65-66. Elhauge explains:
[U]nder standard Harvard School principles, the majority was right to overrule the per se rule against vertical minimum price-fixing. The puzzle is what
provoked a vigorous dissent from Justice Breyer; one of the world's most sophisticated antitrust justices, whose opinions generally have been fully within
the Harvard School. .. . [T]he fact that Breyer's dissent referred no less than
six times to the stare decisis considerations that were cited in a case about restrictions on issue-advocacy ads by a right-to-life group made one wonder
whether the Leegin case had gotten mixed up with larger political disputes
about abortion and campaign finance regulation.
Id.
5

Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887-95.
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this fact renders the decision pro-consumer rather than pro-business.5 5
Recall that decision theory calls for courts to evaluate potential liability
rules in light of three considerations: (1) the likelihood that the rule
will generate an incorrect result; (2) the magnitude of loss that will result from the sort of errors the rule is likely to produce (collectively,
these two considerations determine the rule's expected error costs);
and (3) the difficulty of administering the rule (this determines the
rule's expected decision costs).*56 The question before the Leegin Court
was whether, in light of these three considerations, social welfare would
likely be enhanced (i.e., the sum of decision and error costs reduced)
by moving from Dr. Miles's rule of per se illegality for RPM to a more
probing, rule of reason approach.5 7 The Court decided, for good reason, that social welfare likely would be enhanced.58
To see why this is so, consider how Dr. Miles's per se rule compares
to Leegin's rule of reason approach in terms of the three decisiontheoretic considerations set forth above. With respect to the third, difficulty of administration, the per se rule performed pretty well, though
perhaps not as well as one might initially suppose. Per se rules, which
impose antitrust liability without regard to actual anticompetitive effect,
are usually easy to implement; a plaintiff must show, and the fact finder
must determine, nothing more than that the defendant engaged in the
practice at issue.59 Although that is normally a simple matter to decide,
Supreme Court precedents creating exceptions to Dr. Miles had rendered the inquiry somewhat complicated. For example, the plaintiff
had to show that the manufacturer had not simply adopted a unilateral
policy of refusing to deal with discounters, as in the Supreme Court's
1919 United States v. Colgate & Co. decision.60 And because of the decisions in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. in 1984 and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. in 1998, which involved the termination of price-cutting dealers, the plaintiff had to show that the
55The "pro-business" characterization is odd here, for the losing plaintiff in Leegin was,
in fact, a business-a rogue retailer that did not wish to adhere to the pricing constraints
its manufacturer imposed. See id. at 882-83.
56 See Thomas A. Lambert, A Decision-TheoreticRule ofReason for Minimum Resale PiceMaintenance, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 172 (2010); supranotes 37-39 and accompanying text.
5 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881-82.
58 Id. at 905-06.
59 See, e.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003)
(observing that when the per se rule applies, "[t]he dispositive question generally is not
whether [the challenged practice] was justified, but simply whether it occurred").
6o United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306-08 (1919) (holding that the manufacturer's unilateral, up front refusal to deal with discounters could not constitute an
agreement and thus could not violate section 1).
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defendant manufacturer had entered an "agreement" with compliant
dealers and that the agreement at issue dictated minimum prices, not
simply non-price matters.6 1 The Colgate, Monsanto, and Business Electronics decisions, borne out of misgivings about Dr. Miles, substantially enhanced the decision costs associated with the per se rule. 62 Nevertheless, the rule was comparatively cheap to administer. Leegin's rule of
reason approach will likely increase the costs of administration, though
the Court did take steps to constrain those costs by setting forth specific
factors courts should consider in evaluating the legality of specific instances of RPM and by directing lower courts to craft a structured rule
of reason (in contrast to the traditional, open-ended rule of reason inquiry).63 As explained elsewhere, if structured as the Leegin majority
contemplated, the rule of reason for RPM may be administered fairly
efficiently.64 It likely will, though, involve higher administrative costs
than the Dr.Miles rule.
With respect to the other two decision theory considerations, however, the Leegin approach represents a tremendous improvement over
Dr. Miles. When it comes to likelihood of error, Dr. Miles was a disaster.
As the Leegin majority explained, both economic theory and empirical
evidence suggest that most instances of RPM are procompetitive, so the
per se rule, which automatically condemned all RPM, was highly likely
to generate Type I errors.65
First consider theory. Manufacturers that distribute their products
through retailer-dealers make their money on the sale to the dealers,
61 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733-36 (1988) (holding
that evidence that a dealer was terminated for price cutting could not establish a conspiracy with the remaining dealers to maintain prices at some level absent additional evidence
of an understanding that certain prices were to be charged); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (holding in a case involving termination of a pricecutting dealer that plaintiff's evidence of agreement must tend to exclude the possibility
that the manufacturer merely terminated the dealer because of poor performance and
must suggest that the manufacturer and the remaining dealers were committed to a common scheme involving higher prices).
62 SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 186-88.
63 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907. A rule of reason is almost always more costly to administer
than a per se rule. Whereas a per se rule requires the court to determine only whether the
conduct at issue occurred, a rule of reason analysis requires the evaluating court to assess
whether the challenged conduct had an anticompetitive effect that was not offset by procompetitive benefits. See HOvENKAMP, supra note 2, at 104-08, 114-15.
64 See Lambert, supra note 56, at 168; Lambert, supra note 45, at 1963-64; Christine A.
Varney, A Post-Leegin Approach to Resale Price Maintenance Using a Structured Rule of Reason,
24 ANTITRUST 22, 25 (2009).
65 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889. For this Article's definition of Type I errors, see supra text
accompanying note 34.
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not the resale to consumers. Their chief objective is to maximize purchases by dealers, whose demand will be determined by consumer demand at the retail level. If a retailer's mark-up rises but the retailer does
not otherwise alter its conduct, consumers will reduce their purchases
and the manufacturer, who captures none of the retail mark-up, will
lose sales and profits. All else being equal, then, manufacturers want
retail mark-ups to be as small as possible.66 Because RPM has the effect
of increasing such mark-ups, manufacturers will normally avoid it unless having greater retailer margin induces dealers to provide services
that enhance demand for the manufacturer's product and thereby increase consumer sales, in which case the RPM is output enhancing and
procompetitive.
As the Leegin majority explained, RPM tends to promote demandenhancing dealer services upon which other dealers may free-ride
(training, product demonstration, etc.) because it prevents low-service,
low-cost dealers from profiting by underselling their high-service rivals. 67 In addition, RPM may promote demand-enhancing dealer services that are not susceptible to free-riding. An RPM policy guarantees
dealers an attractive profit margin while a liberal right of termination
can be exercised against dealers with poor sales records. By coupling
these two elements, a manufacturer encourages dealers, who are retailing experts, to use their own energy and innovation to promote the
manufacturer's brand so as to protect the RPM-protected profit margins. RPM thus provides an efficient mechanism for inducing outputenhancing dealer services that are difficult to secure via contract.6 8 In
addition, RPM may provide great assistance to a manufacturer that is a
new entrant into a product market; by assuring retailers of a guaranteed margin on the manufacturer's brand, the RPM encourages retailers to take a chance on the new brand, afford it favorable shelf space,
promote it over established brands, etc. 69
But manufacturers may also demand (or at least concede to) RPM
for anticompetitive reasons. Scholars have identified, and the Leegin majority acknowledged, four such reasons. First, a retailer cartel may de-

6

Id. at 896.

67 Id. at 890-92; see also Telser, supra note 51, at 89-96.
68 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891-92; see also Klein & Murphy, supra note 51, at 266-67.
69 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891-92; see also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics
of Resale Price Maintenance, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1841, 1848

(Wayne D. Collins ed., 2008) ("To secure entry, a new entrant may seek to gain retail distribution by offering independent retailers protections against discounting, in the hope
that margin protection will induce retailers to market and promote the new product.").
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mand that manufacturers impose RPM as a means of shoring up a retailer-level conspiracy. 70 Second, a dominant retailer may demand RPM
in order to protect itself from more efficient retailer rivals.71 Third, colluding manufacturers may collectively impose RPM as a means of increasing price transparency (which aids in cartel enforcement) and discouraging cartel participants from cutting prices to dealers. 72 And
finally, a dominant manufacturer may use RPM to "bribe" retailers to
disfavor non-dominant brands, lest they lose the RPM-guaranteed profit
margin.73
Thus, as the Leegin majority acknowledged, we have two sets of
theories-one procompetitive, one anticompetitive-as to why manufacturers would demand or concede to enhanced retail margins via
RPM. Which set is likely to explain most instances of RPM? Probably
the procompetitive theories, for the preconditions to those theories,
unlike those for the anticompetitive theories, are frequently satisfied. 74
With respect to the anticompetitive explanations for RPM, the retailer cartel theory is plausible only if certain conditions exist. The first
is that the retailer market is susceptible to cartelization, which is rarely
the case, given the low barriers to entry into retail markets. The second
circumstantial requirement is that either the manufacturer's brand is
unique or RPM is also imposed on competing brands of the product,
since otherwise, consumers would respond to the RPM by switching to
another brand.7 5 RPM may operate as a device by which a dominant
retailer excludes more efficient competitors only where RPM is imposed so broadly or on so many brands that more efficient retailers are
unable to gain a foothold.76 The manufacturer cartel theory is plausible
only where the manufacturer market is susceptible to cartelization, due
to factors such as concentration, high entry barriers, and so forth, and
RPM is commonly employed throughout the market because, otherwise, the RPM could not operate to police the cartel.77 And the manu70 Leegin,

551 U.S. at 893; see also Lambert, supra note 45, at 1944-45.
551 U.S. at 893; see also Lambert, supra note 56, at 175-76.
72 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892; see also Lambert, supra note 45, at 1945-49.
7 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894; see Elzinga & Mills, supra note 69, at 1847 ("[RPM] might facilitate an implicit contract between the manufacturer and [its] retailers of the following
nature. The manufacturer ensures retailers of an attractive profit margin on sales of its
own brand in exchange for their refusing to take on the distribution of competing brands,
including brands offered by new entrants.").
7 Lambert, supra note 56, at 181-85.
7 Id. at 181-82.
6 Id. at 183-84.
7 Id. at 183.
71 Leegin,
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facturer exclusion theory is plausible only where the profit margin provided by RPM is significant enough to bribe retailers to drop or disfavor
other brands, and the RPM scheme is implemented broadly among
retail outlets so that "foreclosed" brands cannot simply distribute
through other retailers. 8 Because many retail outlets are now committed to low prices, and therefore would not likely switch to higher-priced
products simply to reap higher margins, they will rarely satisfy the second prerequisite to the manufacturer exclusion theory.79
Whereas the conditions for anticompetitive uses of RPM will rarely
exist, the circumstances necessary for procompetitive effects are quite
common:80
RPM may be used to ensure point-of-sale services ...

that

might be the subject of free-riding whenever such dealerprovided services ... enhance demand for a manufacturer's

product and are susceptible to free-riding .... RPM may provide an optimal means of ensuring dealer performance of unspecified agreements whenever dealer activities would enhance the attractiveness of a manufacturer's offerings, and the
quality-enhancing activities are difficult to delineate in advance or to monitor. RPM may facilitate entry whenever a new
producer seeks to gain access to or promotion by retail outlets
that already stock and provide favorable shelf space to wellestablished brands.8 1
Because these various conditions often exist, procompetitive rationales
for instances of RPM are frequently plausible, unlike anticompetitive
effects. Thus, economic theory predicts that most instances of RPM will
be procompetitive, not anticompetitive, and that a rule of per se illegality will have a high error rate.

78 Id.

79

at 184.

Id.

8o Lambert, supra note 56, at 184-85.
81 Id.
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The empirical evidence on RPM's effects confirms this prediction.8 2
As the Leegin majority observed, both a detailed staff report of the FTC's
Bureau of Economics and an investigation of litigated RPM cases suggest that most instances of RPM are procompetitive rather than anticompetitive.83 Although the Leegin dissent similarly sought to invoke
82 See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. In fact, the empirical case against per
se condemnation of RPM is much stronger than the Leegin majority's analysis suggests. See
Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School's Influence on
Antitrust, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2009, at 189, 205-09 (summarizing recent
empirical analyses of RPM's effects on market output). For example, a survey authored by
several FTC and Department ofJustice economists reviewed twenty-four empirical studies
published between 1984 and 2005 and concluded that "virtually no studies can claim to
have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition."
James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS.
ORG. 639, 658 (2005). Similarly, Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade reviewed twentythree empirical studies of vertical restraints and concluded:
[I]t appears that when manufacturers choose to impose such restraints, not
only do they make themselves better off but they also typically allow consumers to benefit from higher quality products and better service provision ....
The evidence thus supports the conclusion that in these markets, manufacturer and consumer interests are apt to be aligned ....
Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical
Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST EcoNoMIcs 409 (Paolo Buccirossi
ed., 2008).
83 THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES
AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 1-2 (1983); see Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance:
EmpiricalEvidence from Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263, 292-94 (1991). Thomas Overstreet
examined RPM's competitive effect by analyzing all FTC RPM cases from mid-1965
through 1982, and cataloging existing empirical studies of RPM. OVERSTREET, supra, at
63-82, 106-63. With respect to the RPM in the FTC cases, which he took to be representative of instances of RPM generally, Overstreet concluded that most occurred in markets
that could support neither manufacturer nor dealer collusion. Id. at 71-81 (discussing lack
of manufacturer concentration in markets in which RPM was challenged). Overstreet also
noted that:
[O]f the 47 cases with data on the number of distributors, over 80 percent involved in excess of 200 dealers. Widespread dealer collusion involving more
than 100 (or 200) decision makers seems unlikely to be effective or persistent
in the absence of restrictions on entry ...
ordination ....

or some mechanism for overt co-

Id. at 80. Overstreet concluded that "[ilt is unlikely that there is effective manufacturer
collusion featuring RPM in all or even most of these markets" and that "available information also suggests that the use of RPM is unrelated to widespread dealer collusion in most
instances." Id. at 81. Although he provided a more equivocal summary of his findings from
the survey of empirical studies, close examination of those findings suggests that they cannot support the view that RPM is, more often than not, anticompetitive. Id. at 163 ("Theory suggests that RPM can have diverse effects, and the empirical evidence suggests that, in
fact, RPM has been used in the U.S. and elsewhere in both socially desirable and undesirable ways."). But see Lambert, supra note 45, at 1989 n.226 (summarizing the empirical
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empirical evidence to support retaining the rule of per se illegality,& the
evidence it cited was inapposite. It consisted of studies purporting to
show that prices were higher in "fair trade" states, which, for a period of
time, were permitted to declare RPM to be per se legal, than in states
that did not provide immunity for RPM. Those studies are not convincing for two reasons. First, even the procompetitive accounts of RPM involve higher consumer prices, which induce output-enhancing dealer
services, so the existence of such price increases says nothing about the
competitive effects of RPM. 85 Second, fair trade states adopted a rule of
per se legality for RPM, so the results under fair trade would not necessarily follow from evaluating instances of RPM under the rule of reason.86 It seems, then, that both economic theory and empirical evidence
suggest Dr.Miles's automatic condemnation of RPM arrangements is far
more likely to generate errors than is the rule of reason approach embraced in Leegin.87
studies Overstreet examined and demonstrating that they do not support the view that
anticompetitive instances of RPM dominate).
Pauline M. Ippolito examined the 203 reported RPM cases from 1976 through 1982 and
found that allegations of collusion (which one would expect plaintiffs to assert, if there were
any basis for doing so) were rare. Ippolito, supra, at 281-82. Only 9.8% of the private cases
and 13.1 percent of the entire sample of cases included allegations of dealer or manufacturer
collusion. Id. at 281. By contrast, a large percentage of the cases featured characteristics that
were more consistent with procompetitive uses of RPM than with anticompetitive collusion.
See id. at 282. For example, up to 65% of the private cases and up to 68% of the government
cases involved products for which consumer demand would likely be significantly affected by
the provision of "special services" susceptible to free-riding. Id. at 282-85. Approximately
43% of the private cases and 28% of the government cases involved products for which the
dealer's role in product quality determination is important. Id. at 285-89. And in twenty-four
of the twenty-eight "simple goods" cases, where special services are not as likely to be demand
enhancing, the facts were consistent with the use of RPM to enhance dealers' sales efforts. Id.
at 289-91. Based on these findings, Ippolito concluded that "service- and sales-enhancing
theories, taken together, appear to have greater potential to explain the [RPM] practices"
than do collusion-based explanations. Id. at 291-92.
8 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 912 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
85 OVERSTREET, supra note 83, at 116-17, 160 (observing that higher prices resulting
from RPM are consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects).
86 See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 61. Elhauge explains:
[T] his empirical evidence addressed the wrong question, because it compared prices in states with per se illegality to prices in states with a rule of per
se legality. A rule of per se legality is likely to allow more anticompetitive effects than a rule of reason that remains available to redress anticompetitive
forms of the conduct. Thus, the price effects of switching from per se illegality to per se legality are not the same as switching from a rule of per se illegality to a rule of reason, which was the relevant issue here.
Id.
87

See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887-95.
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The final decision-theoretic consideration is the magnitude of loss
from errors. The Dr. Miles rule produced more Type I errors than will
Leegin's rule of reason, which will likely tend to reduce errors overall but
may raise the incidence of Type II errors. When it comes to antitrust,
though, false convictions tend to produce greater social loss than false
acquittals." When an anticompetitive instance of RPM is improperly
approved, social cost (allocative inefficiency) may result from market
power that is created or maintained. When a procompetitive instance of
RPM is improperly condemned, by contrast, the social cost consists of
the immediate benefit foregone by stopping the challenged instance
plus any future benefits that are thwarted because of the precedent
condemning that particular type of efficient conduct. Whereas the former harm-market power-is generally self-correcting by entry or, in
the case of collusion, cheating, the latter harm-economy-wide thwarting of an output-enhancing practice-may be undone only by a court
decision (or legislative or regulatory development) that corrects the bad
precedent.89 False convictions are therefore more likely to cause greater
and more durable harm than false acquittals and should thus be more
stridently avoided by the governing liability rule.
The holding of Leegin is thus wholly defensible from the perspective of decision theory. Both the "likelihood of error" and "magnitude
of loss from expected errors" considerations weigh heavily in favor of
rule of reason adjudication. Although the "difficulty of administration"
consideration might support adherence to the Dr. Miles rule, that concern is not so compelling. As noted, the Dr. Miles rule was actually fairly
difficult to implement, and the Leegin majority helpfully constrained
decision costs by noting specific factors courts should consider in evaluating instances of RPM and by directing the lower courts to craft a

8

See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 2-3.
89AsJudge Easterbrook has explained:
If the [antitrust] court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits
may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces
sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs
by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over
time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.
True, this long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim. The central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long
run. But this should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful
practices are self-correcting while erroneous condemnations are not.

Id.
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structured rule of reason.90 Decision theory therefore supports the outcome in Leegin.
2. Weyerhaeuserand Predatory Bidding
Although the Leegin majority implicitly adopted a decisiontheoretic analysis, the Court's unanimous decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. embraced decision theory explicitly.91 The court held that predatory bidding plaintiffs must make the

same two-pronged showing required of predatory pricing plaintiffs. 9 2
Plaintiff Ross-Simmons and defendant Weyerhaeuser, which both
operated hardwood lumber sawmills in the Pacific Northwest, regularly
bid against each other in purchasing the red alder sawlogs that they
processed and sold as finished hardwood lumber.93 Ross-Simmons accused Weyerhaeuser, which had grown to be substantially larger than
Ross-Simmons and was acquiring about sixty-five percent of the alder
logs available for sale in the region, of "predatory bidding."9 4 Specifically, Ross-Simmons claimed that Weyerhaeuser bought more sawlogs
than it needed and bid up the price for sawlogs higher than necessary
to attain the quantity it required.9 5 At the same time, Weyerhaeuser did
not increase the price of its output; market prices for finished hardwood lumber actually fell. 96 This created a revenue squeeze: the sawmills' revenues (reflecting market prices of finished hardwood) fell
even as the sawmills' costs (reflecting the unnecessarily high price of
the most important input) were rising. After enduring this squeeze for
several years, Ross-Simmons shut down its mill completely in 2001.97 It
then sued Weyerhaeuser for monopolization and attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.98
At trial, Weyerhaeuser proposed a predatory bidding jury instruction that incorporated the predatory pricing elements set forth in the
Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & William9o See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
91 Weyerhaeuser, 549
92 Id.

U.S. at 325-26.

3 Id. at 315-16.
94

Id. at 316.

95

Id.

96 Id.

549 U.S. at 316.
§ 2 (2006); Weyerhaeuser,549 U.S. at 316. Specifically, Ross-Simmons maintained that Weyerhaeuser had used "its dominant position in the alder sawlog market to
drive up the prices for alder sawlogs to levels that severely reduced or eliminated the profit
margins of Weyerhaeuser's alder sawmill competition." Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 316.
98 15 U.S.C.
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son Tobacco Corp.9 The Brooke Group Court held that a plaintiff complaining of predatory pricing must establish that (1) "the prices complained of [were] below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs," and
(2) there was "a dangerous probability" at the time of the below-cost
pricing that the rival would eventually "recoup[] its investment" in the
predation by charging supracompetitive prices.100 Weyerhaeuser maintained that the jury should be instructed that overbidding for sawlogs
could constitute anticompetitive conduct only if it resulted in Weyerhaeuser's operating at a loss, and if a dangerous probability of its recoupment of losses existed. 101 The district court rejected the proposed
instruction and instead told the jury that it could find an anticompetitive act if it concluded that Weyerhaeuser "purchased more logs than it
needed or paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in order to prevent [Ross-Simmons] from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair
price."10 2 Concluding that Ross-Simmons had proven monopolization,
the jury returned a $26 million verdict, which was trebled to approximately $79 million. 0 3
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Weyerhaeuser's argument that Brooke Group's requirements for
predatory pricing should similarly apply to predatory bidding claims.104
Reasoning that predatory bidding does not necessarily produce the
same consumer benefit as predatory pricing (i.e., lower prices for at
least the short term), the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the concerns
that led the Brooke Group Court to establish a high standard of liability
in the predatory pricing context do not carry over to this predatory
bidding context with the same force."105 It held that the Brooke Group

9 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317; see Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993).
100 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222, 224.
101 Weyerhaeuser,549 U.S. at 317; see Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222, 224.
102

Weyerhaeuser,549 U.S. at 317. The district court instructed the jury that:
One of Plaintiffs' contentions in this case is that the Defendant purchased
more logs than it needed or paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in
order to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair
price. If you find this to be true, you may regard it as an anti-competitive act.

Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1039 n.30 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting the lower court's instruction to the jury).
103 Weyerhaeuser,549 U.S. at 317.
104 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians,411 F.3d at 1035-36.
105 Id. at 1037-38.
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standards for predatory pricing liability do not apply to claims of predatory bidding.10 6
In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Brooke Group's standard of liability does apply to predatory bidding claims.107 The Court began its
analysis by discussing the rationale for the Brooke Group standard. 08
That standard is not based on a conclusion that low, but above-cost,
pricing can never be anticompetitive.'" Rather, it reflects a recognition
that courts cannot identify and condemn anticompetitive above-cost
price cuts without chilling legitimate, procompetitive price cuts. As the
Court explained:
The first prong of the [Brooke Group] test-requiring that prices be below cost-is necessary because "[a]s a general rule, the
exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost
either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator,
and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control." We were particularly wary of allowing recovery for above-cost price cutting because allowing such claims could, perversely, "chil[l] legitimate price
cutting,"which directly benefits consumers.110
The Court thus acknowledged that the Brooke Group standard is ultimately concerned with minimizing error costs.'
The Court then reasoned that the regulation of predatory bidding,
which it took to be "analytically similar" to predatory pricing, raises sim106 Id. at

1038.

107 Weyerhaeuser, 549

U.S. at 317-18.
318-20.
109See id. It is well understood that so-called "limit" pricing, which occurs when a firm
with market power sets its prices above its costs but below the profit-maximizing level so as
to deter entry, can be anticompetitive. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 161-62. Although
such pricing may impose competitive harm and injure consumers in the long run, it is
simply too difficult for antitrust tribunals to police. As Herbert Hovenkamp has observed,
"No court has ever developed a workable test for determining when an above-cost price is
anticompetitive." Id. at 162. In addition, there is the problem of fashioning a remedy. Id.
Forcing the defendant to raise its price to the monopoly level to invite new entry poses
serious risks to consumers if, for example, entry does not occur instantly. See id. Alternatively, forcing the defendant to lower its price to competitive levels would make eventual
entry even less likely and would "put the court in the position of a regulatory agency, constantly monitoring the dominant firm's prices to ensure that they stayed near the competitive level." Id.
110 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 319 (second and third alterations in original) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted) (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223).
108 Id. at

I1I See id.
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ilar error cost concerns. 112 It noted that because predatory bidding, like
predatory pricing, involves a certain up-front loss and only a speculative
future gain, it will rarely be attempted.11 s A liability rule making it easy
to establish predatory bidding would thus entail a high likelihood of
error (i.e., false convictions).
Moreover, as in the predatory pricing context, the magnitude of
loss from false convictions would be great. As with price-cutting,
"[t]here are myriad legitimate reasons-ranging from benign to affirmatively procompetitive-why a buyer might bid up input prices."114
For example, the firm might (1) simply miscalculate its input needs;
(2) anticipate increased consumer demand for its output; (3) face different efficiencies than its input market rivals (e.g., it may be able to
extract greater value from the input, which would cause it to have a
higher reservation price, or it may use a particularly input-intensive
production process, which would cause it to demand more inputs); or
(4) seek to acquire excess inputs as a hedge against future price increases.115
112 See id. at 321, 323 ("More importantly, predatory bidding mirrors predatory pricing
in respects that we deemed significant to our analysis in Brooke Group."). The Court observed that predatory bidding and pricing involve an attempt to attain market power, that
is, the power to enhance one's profits by affecting prices. Id. at 319-20. Whereas predatory
pricing may permit a firm to attain monopoly power and drive output prices upward by
withholding one's production, predatory bidding may enable a firm to attain monopsony
power, enabling it to drive input prices and costs downward by cutting back on one's purchases. Id. Exercises of both types of market power result in allocative inefficiency, the
wealth loss that occurs when resources are not directed toward their highest and best uses
because of price distortions. Id. Moreover, the Court observed, claims of predatory-pricing
and predatory-bidding involve "strikingly similar allegations." Id. at 322. A predatorypricing plaintiff will allege that the defendant reduced the price of its product in order to
drive the plaintiff out of business so that the defendant, insulated from selling competition, could then raise its prices above competitive levels. A predatory-bidding plaintiff will
allege that the defendant deliberately bid up the price of a key input in order to drive the
plaintiff out of business so that the defendant, insulated from buying competition, could
then cut back on its input purchases and thereby drive down the price of inputs. Both
strategies "logically require firms to incur short-term losses on the chance that they might
reap supracompetitive profits in the future." Id.
Despite the similarity of predatory pricing and predatory bidding, Keith Hylton has
argued persuasively that predatory bidding poses greater potential for anticompetitive
harm. See Keith N. Hylton, Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs, 53 ANTITRUST
BULL. 51, 52 (2008). Nonetheless, decision-theoretic considerations-in particular, concerns about error costs-lead Hylton to approve of Weyerhaeuser's holding. Id. at 52-53.
11 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 323 ("Predatory pricing requires a firm to suffer certain
losses in the short term on the chance of reaping supracompetitive profits in the future. A
rational business will rarely make this sacrifice. The same reasoning applies to predatory
bidding." (internal citations omitted)).
114 Id.
Is Id.
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A rule that made it easy to punish high bid prices or large purchases of inputs could chill all sorts of procompetitive (or at least benign) conduct, causing significant social loss. This is particularly the
case because, as Keith Hylton has observed, the prices generated by
firms' unfettered input-bidding produce a tremendous amount of socially valuable information like predictions about future output demand, expectations concerning future input supply, and the like." 6
Thus, consideration of error costs-a function of a legal rule's likelihood of error and the magnitude of loss from expected errors-supports application in the predatory bidding context of the admittedly
stringent Brooke Groupliability test.
Although the Weyerhaeuser Court focused solely on error costs and
did not explicitly address decision costs, consideration of such costs
would only have bolstered its holding. In the context of predatory bidding, the alternative to the Brooke Group standard would be something
like the jury instruction given by the district court: the defendant is liable if it "purchased more [inputs] than it needed, or paid a higher
price for [inputs] than necessary, in order to prevent [input market
rivals] from obtaining the [inputs] they needed at a fair price."" 7 This
sort of vague liability rule would open the door to long and costly expeditions to establish the number of inputs "needed," the price "necessary" to obtain such a quantity, the motives of the defendant in making
its bids, and the "fair" price that should have been guaranteed to the
defendant's rivals. Thus, Weyerhaeuser's holding effectively minimized
the sum of decision and error costs, as decision theory prescribes.
3. LinkLine and "Price Squeezes"
Decision theory also played a central role in Pacific Bell Telephone
Co. v. LinkLine Communications, Inc., in which the Court held that a monopolization claim cannot arise from a mere "price squeeze" by a vertically integrated firm that possesses monopoly power in the upstream
(input) market but is not subject to an antitrust duty to deal with its
rivals in the downstream (output) market." 8 As Chief Justice Roberts
explained in the majority opinion, the holding in LinkLine was ultimately dictated by two Supreme Court precedents that themselves in-

116 Hylton,

supra note 112, at 66-68.
Weyerhaeuser,549 U.S. at 317.
118See LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1109, 1120.
117
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corporated the insights of decision theory.119 Moreover, independent
decision-theoretic concerns bolster the Court's holding.
Plaintiff LinkLine sold DSL Internet service to retail consumers. 120
So did defendant AT&T. 121 LinkLine, however, did not actually own all
the facilities needed to provide DSL service; it leased such facilities from
AT&T, its rival in the retail DSL market.122 Antitrust law did not impose
a duty on AT&T to lease DSL facilities to its retail rivals, but a federal
communications law did: as a condition for a recent merger, the Federal
Communications Commission required AT&T to provide access to the
leased facilities at a price no greater than the retail price of its DSL service.123 LinkLine was thus AT&T's customer in the upstream wholesale
market (leasing an input-access to DSL infrastructure) and its competitor in the downstream retail market (selling the same output, DSL
service, to consumers).
LinkLine claimed that AT&T had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a price squeeze. 124 The squeeze occurred because AT&T charged such a high wholesale price for access to its DSL
infrastructure, and such a low retail price for the DSL service it sold to
customers, that LinkLine found itself excluded from the retail market.125 Observing that price squeeze claims had been recognized by
several circuit courts of appeals, the district court denied AT&T's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the price squeeze claim.126 It
then certified its order for interlocutory appeal on the question of
whether the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Verizon Communications
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko bars price squeeze claims where the
parties are compelled to deal under the federal communications
laws.' 2 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
119 See id. at 1119-21. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Steven, Souter, and Ginsburg,
filed a concurring opinion that did not dispute the central holding or reasoning of the
majority opinion but would have prescribed a different procedural outcome. Id. at 1124
(Breyer, J., concurring). Specifically, the concurring justices would have allowed the district court, on remand, to consider predatory pricing allegations the plaintiff had asserted
in an amended complaint that was never ruled on by the Ninth Circuit (and thus, in the
majority's view, was not properly before the Supreme Court). Id. at 1124-25.
120 Id. at 1115 (majority opinion).
121Id. The defendants' names and corporate structures changed over the course of the
litigation-the Supreme Court referred to them collectively as AT&T. Id. at 1115 n.1.
122
123
124
125

Id. at 1115.

Id.
129 S. Ct. at 1115.
Id.
126 See id. at 1116 (discussing proceedings in the district court).
127 LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1116; Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 405 (2004).
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district court's denial of AT&T's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
reasoning that price squeeze claims, which were recognized prior to
Trinko and were not present in that case, remain viable. 28
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court reasoned that
LinkLine's price squeeze theory consisted of two components-a high
wholesale price and a low retail price-neither of which could constitute an antitrust violation under existing precedents.' 29 A claim based
on AT&T's charging a high wholesale price for access to DSL facilities
would be barred by Tinko.130 That case held that a vertically integrated
monopolist has no general duty to deal in the upstream market with its
downstream rivals and that, absent some specific antitrust duty to deal,
there can be no antitrust liability for dealing in a shoddy fashion.' 3'
The Court in LinkLine reasoned that if a firm lacking an antitrust duty
to deal faces no antitrust liability for dealing and providing poor service, then such a firm would also not be liable for dealing and charging
high prices.' 3 2 Thus, LinkLine could not succeed against AT&T on the
theory that it had charged too high a price for access to DSL facilities
that it had no antitrust duty to provide.
As for the other component of the alleged price squeeze, any
claim based on AT&T's charging a low retail price for DSL service
would be barred by Brooke Group unless LinkLine established the prerequisites to predatory pricing liability (i.e., below-cost pricing and a
likelihood of recoupment).133 Because the complaint before the Supreme Court had not included allegations of predatory pricing at the
retail level, AT&T could face no liability on the basis of its low retail
prices.134 The Court therefore concluded that:
Plaintiffs' price-squeeze claim ... is ... nothing more than an

amalgamation of a meritless claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the wholesale level. If there is no duty to deal at
the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level,

128

LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 2007).

129 See LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1120.
130 Id. at 1119 ("A straightforward

application of our recent decision in Trinko forecloses any challenge to AT&T's wholesale prices."); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-11.
3' Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-11.
132 LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1120.
133 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-24 (positing requirements for predatory pricing
claims).
'4 LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1120.
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then a firm is certainly not required to price both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals' profit margins. 3 5
Because decision theory concerns largely motivated the holdings in
Brooke Group and Trinko, they were central to the Court's conclusion in
LinkLine.136 As explained above, Brooke Group's holding that there can be
no predatory pricing liability absent below-cost pricing and a likelihood
of recoupment was based not on a belief that above-cost prices can never be anticompetitive but instead on skepticism about the judiciary's
ability to regulate prices that are above-cost, but anticompetitively low,
without chilling pro-consumer price competition.13 7 In other words, the
Brooke Group holding arose from a desire to limit error costs. The test in
that case also constrains decision costs, for inquiries into whether the
defendant's prices are below its costs and whether the market is susceptible to a recoupment period are complicated, but are also far less costly
for the parties and courts than an inquiry into whether the defendant
has attempted to preclude entry by pricing below its profit-maximizing
level, which is extremely difficult to ascertain.138
Trinko's holding similarly reflected decision-theoretic considerations. With respect to error costs, the Trinko Court observed that a
broad rule requiring monopolists to deal with their rivals could impose
numerous and costly errors by encouraging collusion and reducing
firms' incentives to innovate.13 9 A broad forced-dealing rule would also
entail high decision costs, for "[e]nforced sharing ... requires antitrust
courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity,
and other terms of dealing-a role for which they are ill suited." 140
When there is a non-antitrust duty to deal with one's rivals, imposition
of antitrust liability for deficient dealing (unresponsiveness, shoddy
service, and so forth) would entail both high error costs and high deci-

135Id.
136Id. at 1119-21.
137See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.

138 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-24; cf HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 162-64 (discussing difficulty of policing "limit pricing").
139 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08.
Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically
beneficial facilities. . . . Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.
Id.
14o Id. at 408.
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sion costs. 141 Thus, decision-theoretic concerns underpinned both of
Trinko's primary holdings, that there is no general antitrust duty to deal
with one's rivals and that there can be no antitrust liability for deficiently discharging a duty imposed by another body of law. 142 LinkLine's
holding, logically implied by Brooke Group and Trinko, should therefore
be viewed as a product of decision theory.
Dennis Carlton has further explained how LinkLine comports with
a decision-theoretic approach.1 43 He first observes that any procompetitive benefits that would result from recognizing the price squeeze as a
form of anticompetitive conduct would be small. 144 Most of the time, a
vertically integrated monopolist whose upstream product is used in
fixed proportions to produce the downstream product will have no incentive to engage in a price squeeze to eliminate its rivals in the downstream market.145 If there are economic (i.e., supracompetitive) profits
to be had in the downstream market, the monopolist can capture those
profits by simply setting its input price at a level that permits its downstream rivals to stay in business earning a normal (competitive) rate of
return but prevents them from earning supracompetitive profits.146 The
monopolist would gain nothing by destroying its downstream rivals via a

141 Id. ("The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.
One false-positive risk is that [a monopolist's] failure to provide a service with sufficient
alacrity might have nothing to do with exclusion."). The Court continues: "Effective remediation of violations of regulatory sharing requirements will ordinarily require continuing
supervision of a highly detailed decree . . . . An antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective
day-to-day enforcer of these detailed sharing obligations." Id. at 414-15.
142 See id. at 408-16.
143 See Dennis W. Carlton, Should "PiceSqueeze" Be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive
Conduct?, 4J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 271, 274-76 (2008).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 271.
146 See id. at 275. Carlton explains:

Firm 1 [the vertically integrated monopolist] cannot gain by driving Firm 2
[its downstream rival] out of the market for B [the downstream product].
The reason is that Firm 1 already has all the power it needs, by assumption, to
extract the profit from Firm 2 by raising [the price of the input] to just enable Firm 2 to earn a normal rate of return without driving Firm 2 out of
business. Firm 1 gains nothing further by destroying Firm 2, even though any
sales that Firm 2 would have made would instead be made by Firm 1. Because
the increased profits that Firm 1 would earn by so doing would be the same as
Firm 2 (assuming that both firms are efficient), and because that profit on
Product B is "normal," there is no extra (above normal) profit to be earned.
This example is just an illustration of the "one monopoly profit theory" associated with the Chicago School.
Id.
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price squeeze; its incremental profit gain in the downstream market
would be perfectly offset by its loss of profits in the upstream market.
Admittedly, this analysis may not apply in more complex situations,
such as when the downstream firm sells a differentiated substitute that
constrains the monopolist's pricing and permits the downstream rival
to earn some supracompetitive profit.14 7 But in that situation, consumers may or may not be better off with a rule forbidding the monopolist
to utilize a price squeeze to eliminate the downstream rival.148 Consumers could be unharmed, or even benefited, if the monopolist began
producing the differentiated substitute so as to capture its former rival's
supracompetitive profits without having to pay a supracompetitive price
for the input. 149 The elimination of double marginalization could end
up lowering prices for consumers.15 0 Thus, a rule prohibiting price
squeezes to preserve a vertically integrated monopolist's downstream
rivals promises only speculative, and probably small, procompetitive
benefits.
And yet the costs of such a rule would be significant. If, as in LinkLine, the vertically integrated monopolist has no antitrust duty to deal
with its downstream rival, recognition of a price squeeze theory could
create substantial consumer harm.'5 1 The monopolist could avoid antitrust liability altogether if it simply refused to sell inputs to its downstream rivals, but it would risk antitrust liability if it made such sales at
prices that were deemed after the fact to create an exclusionary price
14

Id. at 275-76.

'4 Id. at 276.
149 Carlton, supra note

143, at 275-76. Carlton explains:

If Firm 1 [the vertically integrated monopolist] drives out Firm 2 [the downstream rival that produces a differentiated substitute, Product B], then even
though it may be less efficient than Firm 2 (which will tend to cause price to
rise), it may actually lower the price of Product B' The reason has to do with
the elimination of double marginalization.
Id. at 276.
15o Id. Double monopolization occurs when a monopolist charges a supracompetitive
price for an input and its rival charges a supracompetitive price for the end product. See id.
For example:
When Firm 2 buys Product A [the input] at PA [the monopoly price], it faces
a price that is above the marginal cost of Product A, yet PA is the marginal cost
to Firm 2 of an additional unit of Product A. In contrast, when Firm 1 produces an additional unit of Product B', it recognizes that, because it produces
Product A, the additional cost of Product A is not PA, but the lower marginal
cost of A.
Id.
151Id. at 276-78.
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squeeze.152 Thus, recognition of a price squeeze theory in the absence
of an antitrust duty to deal would encourage vertically integrated firms
with upstream monopolies to refuse to make any input sales to downstream rivals.153 Such refusals would create greater consumer harm
than would continued input sales at high wholesale prices that created
a price squeeze because an outright refusal to sell the input would deprive consumers of otherproducts that incorporate the input and are sold
only by downstream rivals.154
Decision theory therefore counsels rejecting the price squeeze
theory of liability in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal. In simple
cases, price squeezes create no competitive harm. 5 5 In more complicated cases, price squeezes may or may not harm consumers, and determining whether there has been consumer harm requires complicated inquiries into the relative efficiencies of the monopolist versus its
purportedly excluded rival, the magnitude of double marginalization,
and the like.15 6 Moreover, creating price squeeze liability absent a duty
to deal would simply encourage the vertically integrated monopolist to
raise the price of its downstream product so as to ensure a sufficient

152 Id.

at 276. As Carlton explains:

In the absence of a duty to deal, Firm 1 would have no duty to provide Product A as an input to Firm 2, but if it did so, it would be subject to potential liability if the prices that it charged for Product A and Product B excluded
Firm 2 from the market for Product B.
Id.
153 See id.
154

See id. at 277. Carlton offers the following example:

Suppose that Firm 2 uses Product A to produce, in addition to Product B [the
downstream product the monopolist also produces], some Product C that
Firm 1 cannot produce. Firm 2 buys Product A, uses it to produce Product C
as well as Product B and this benefits consumers who otherwise would be
forced to do without Product C. Suppose now that Firm 2 can profitably produce Product C but not Product B at the current price for Product A. A price
squeeze doctrine would permit Firm 2 to complain that it is subject to a price
squeeze on Product B. Firm 1 could respond to this liability threat by increasing the price of Product B. This would be bad for consumers, at least in the
short run ... . Firm 1 could also avoid liability simply by refusing to deal with
Firm 2. If it did so, it would deprive consumers of Product C, creating consumer harm at the same time that it avoids antitrust liability. Thus, there is
the increased risk of significant harm created by the incentive to avoid antitrust liability if there is a price squeeze doctrine.
Id.
155
156

See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
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margin for its rivals or to stop selling its input to downstream rivals.' 5 7
Both outcomes threaten substantial consumer harm. Accordingly, it is
simply not "worth it" to recognize a price squeeze theory of liability in
the absence of an antitrust duty to deal, even if price squeezes may, on
occasion, cause anticompetitive harm.15 8
4. Independent Ink: Tying and Patents
The Court's unanimous decision in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. rejected the view that a tying defendant's possession of
a patent on its tying product gives rise to a presumption that the defendant has market power in the tying product market. 15 9 This greatly reduced error costs in tying cases involving patented tying products and is
thus consistent with a decision-theoretic approach. Moreover, in expressly rejecting a compromise position advocated by a group of "postChicago" antitrust commentators, the Independent Ink Court further
recognized the limits of antitrust.160
See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
But see Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price
Squeeze Claims, 51 Aiuz. L. REv. 273, 299 (2009). Erik and Herbert Hovenkamp have argued for recognition of a limited price squeeze theory when facts suggest that the monopolist utilized the price squeeze "to prevent the smaller [downstream] rival from integrating upstream into the defendant's monopolized primary market." See id. They explain
their recommended rule as follows:
157

158

Defendants should enjoy a safe harbor, or per se legality, when the margin between the wholesale price to the rival and the output price of the finished
product is greater than the total (fixed + variable) processing costs that the defendant incurs for production between the two stages.... If the margin between the defendant's price for the upstream input to the rival and the defendant's own second-stage output price is below either the defendant's average
total or the average variable cost of intervening production, then some further
inquiry may be necessary. The most likely explanations are joint costs (economies of scope) or price discrimination, in which cases we would not find liability, and we would not force an antitrust tribunal to assume the regulator's role
of allocating fixed costs among multiple products. Liability is appropriate in the
relatively uncommon situation when a margin squeeze has clearly been created
by the dominant firm in order to prevent the smaller rival from integrating upstream into the defendant's monopolized primary market.
Id. at 298-99. Although evaluation of the Hovenkamps' proposed liability rule would require empirical data on the incidence, success rate, and cost of price squeezes aimed at
preventing upstream integration, it would be surprising if the complicated liability rule
they propose, which would impose high decision costs to police a situation that they concede is "relatively uncommon," proved to be justified on decision-theoretic grounds. See id.
159 547 U.S. at 31.Justice Alito, who was sworn in after the oral argument in Independent
Ink, did not participate in the decision. See generally id.
16 See id. at 43-45.
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Tying is selling one's monopoly product, the "tying" product, on
the condition that the buyer also purchase a separate "tied" product.16 1
This practice is currently governed by a quasi-per se rule.162 Under that
rule, a tie-in arrangement is per se illegal as long as (1) the tie-in involves multiple products, as opposed to a single product consisting of
multiple parts, (2) the seller has market power over the tying product,
and (3) the tie-in affects a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in
the tied product market. 163
The plaintiff in Independent Ink relied on a Supreme Court dictum
that "if the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the
product elsewhere gives the seller market power."164 Therefore the
plaintiff had simply assumed that the defendant, whose tying product
consisted of patented printer technology, possessed tying market power
that satisfied the second element. 165 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to establish tying market power, since it had presented no evidence defining the tying product market or establishing the defendant's
power within it.166 Citing the aforementioned Supreme Court dictum,
the Federal Circuit reversed on the ground that tying market power
should be presumed in light of the defendant's possession of patents on
the tying product.167 The narrow issue brought before the Supreme
Court was thus whether a presumption of tying market power will arise
when the defendant holds a patent on the tying product.1 68 Consistent
with views of antitrust scholars, Congress, and federal antitrust regulators, the Court held that the mere possession of a patent on a tying
product does not confer market power over the tying product market.169
161 SeeJefferson

Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 28-29 (1984).

162See id.
163 See id. at 8. Importantly, this last element does not require that the tie-in cause substantial foreclosure of marketing opportunities in the tied product market; rather, it must
simply affect more than a de minimis dollar volume of commerce in the tied market. See
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969).
164Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 16.
165 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 31-32, 46 (noting that the tied product was defendant's
unpatented ink and that the ink market was competitive).
166 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1167, 1173, 1177 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
167Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
168Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 31-32.
'6 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (4)-(5) (2006) (amending patenting laws to mandate proof of
market power in the tying product in the patent misuse context); Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at
38-42; PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW I 1737a (2d ed. 2004) ("[Tlhere is no
economic basis for inferring any amount of market power from the mere fact that the defen-
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From the standpoint of decision theory, the merits of Independent
Ink's holding are obvious. The market power presumption the Court
rejected was, put bluntly, an error cost machine. Patents are ubiquitous;
market power is not. Many, if not most, products incorporating some
patented technology are sold in competitive markets. 170 Accordingly,
the market power presumption regularly deemed the "tying market
power" element of a tying claim to be satisfied when, in fact, it was not.
To the extent the element was designed to screen out non-meritorious
tying claims, the market power presumption rendered the element
largely ineffective. In jettisoning the presumption, the Supreme Court
thus substantially reduced the number of false positives its tying doctrine generates and the social losses associated with those mistakes. Although elimination of the market power presumption did raise decision costs by requiring that plaintiffs actually prove and courts actually
evaluate claims of tying market power, the increase in decision costs is
likely dwarfed by the error cost reduction the Court's holding achieves.
Accordingly, Independent Ink's holding makes perfect sense from a decision-theoretic perspective.
The Independent Ink Court further displayed a sensitivity to decision
theory concerns in rejecting a compromise position on the market
dant holds a valid patent .... "); 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 4.2a
(2009) ("[C]overage of one's product with an intellectual property right does not confer a
monopoly."); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374 (2003); U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.2 (1995) ("Agencies will 'not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner."'); Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie?," 4 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 57 & n.340 (1991) (noting that the market power presumption has been extensively criticized and citing sources).
The Court observed that the presumption of market power over a patented product
first arose in a 1917 patent misuse case, Motion PicturePatents Co. v. UniversalFilm Manufacturing Co., that "migrated" from patent law to antitrust law at the Government's urging in
InternationalSalt Co. v. United States, a 1947 case, and was eliminated in the patent context
by 102 Stat. 4676 in 1988. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (5); Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 38-42;
Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 509 (1917). The Court reasoned that because "the patent misuse doctrine provided the basis for the market power presumption, it would be
anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust after Congress has eliminated its
foundation." Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 42. The Court also observed that its conclusion
that a tying defendant's tying market power must be proven, not presumed, even when the
defendant possesses a patent on the tying product "accords with the vast majority of academic literature on the subject." Id. at 43 n.4.
170 See F.M. Scherer, Professor of Econ., Swarthmore Coll., Panel Discussion: The Value
of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commercial Rights, in 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547
(1984-1985) ("[S]tudies suggest that the vast majority of all patents confer very little monopoly power.").
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power presumption. 171 In seeking to sustain the judgment in its favor,
plaintiff Independent Ink presented the Court with a narrower alternative to its requested holding that possession of a patent creates a presumption of market power. 72 That narrower alternative would have
created a presumption of tying market power when a defendant with a
patent on its tying product imposes a "requirements tie," mandating
that tying product purchasers also purchase their requirements of unpatented complements from the defendant. 173
As Post-Chicago scholars Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence
Sullivan explained in an amicus brief advocating this narrower holding,
the presumption of tying market power in cases involving patented tying products and requirements ties would enable antitrust to police the
use of tie-ins to price discriminate and extract additional consumer
surplus by metering consumer demand for the tying product.'74 Nalebuff, Ayres, and Sullivan argued that such price discrimination and
surplus extraction are anticompetitive effects that are properly addressed by antitrust.175
The Supreme Court disagreed, although it acknowledged that metermg tie-ins may result in price discrimination and surplus extraction.176 Concluding that price discrimination "occurs in fully competitive markets" and that "[m]any tying arrangements, even those involving
patents and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market," the Court rejected the narrower holding advocated in the
amicus brief.177 The Court thus made clear that, although it recognizes
that price discrimination and additional surplus extraction are possible
effects of tying, they are not appropriately deemed anticompetitive effects subject to condemnation under the antitrust laws.
This is a salutary acknowledgement of antitrust's limits. In recent
years, Post-Chicago theorists have argued that antitrust should pursue
not simply the extension of market power but also acts that involve the
'71 See Independent Ink, 547
172 Id.

U.S. at 43-44.

173 Id. at 44. An example of required unpatented complements might include unpatented ink for a patented printer. See id.
174 See Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5-24, Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04-1329).
15 Id. at 24-27.
176 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 44 (referencingJefferson Parish's discussion of price discrimination through tying).
177 Id. at 45; see also AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, 1 1711(f); LANDES & POSNER, Supra
note 169, at 374-75; William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination:Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 666 (2003).
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extraction of additional consumer surplus, even if the acts do not
threaten to enhance market power.178 Price discrimination is one of the
surplus-extractive, but not market power-expanding, practices that these scholars would like to police under the antitrust laws.' 79 But price
discrimination, particularly of the metering variety, frequently enhances overall social welfare by expanding market output, so efforts to
constrain it may involve high error costs. 80
Moreover, many of the liability rules the Post-Chicago scholars
have proposed for policing price discrimination and surplus extraction
are exceedingly difficult to implement and provide little guidance to
business planners.18 ' Thus they raise decision costs while chilling business practices that are procompetitive but may be avoided because of
the lack of legal clarity. The Supreme Court acknowledged that requirements tie-ins may result in price discrimination and surplus extraction but are nonetheless "fully consistent with a free, competitive
market." 182 In doing so, the Court implied that an extractive effect is
not enough to render a practice anticompetitive, and it seemingly limited antitrust's domain to acts that could enhance market power. The
Court thereby moved antitrust in a direction decision theory would
counsel, a direction that recognizes antitrust's inherent limits.
5. Dagherand Joint Ventures
The Court's unanimous decision in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher coheres
with decision theory in that it promises to reduce the error and decision costs associated with challenges to the business practices of competitorjoint ventures.18 3 Dagherheld that it is not per se illegal for a law178 See Elhauge, supranote 48, at 426-42; cf Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Appropriate
Antitrust Policy Towards SingleFirn Conduct 8-14 (Econ. Analysis Grp., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't
ofJustice, Discussion Paper No. 08-2, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 111665.
179 See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 404-13.
180 See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discriminationas an
Antitrust justificationfor Intellectual Property Refusals to DeaA 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 612-13
(2003).
181 See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 468-77. For example, Einer Elhauge's recently proposed rule for evaluating bundled discounts (so as to police discounts that cause price
discrimination and surplus extraction) calls for courts to determine whether the unbundied price exceeds the "but for" single-product price that the defendant would offer absent the discounting scheme. See id. As a practical matter, how is a court to determine such
prices and how can a bundled discounter be assured that a judge or jury will not deem its
unbundled price to exceed the but for level? This complicated, vague rule would chill
bundled discounting.
18 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 45.
183 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006).
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fully constituted joint venture to set the price of its products and clarified that the "ancillary restraints" doctrine applies only to restraints on
non-venture activities.'"
In 1998, gasoline companies Texaco and Shell formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, that combined the companies' downstream
gasoline refining and marketing operations in the western United
States.185 The formation of Equilon, which was approved by the Federal
Trade Commission and the attorneys general of California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, created synergies and productive efficiencies
for Texaco and Shell. 186 The gasoline Equilon developed was sold to
downstream purchasers under the original Texaco and Shell brand
names, but Equilon charged a uniform price for its gasoline within
each geographic market.187 After Equilon had commenced operation, a
class of Texaco and Shell service station owners sued the companies,
alleging per se illegal horizontal price-fixing because Equilon's Texaco
and Shell branded gasoline was offered at a single price.'" Notably, the
plaintiffs chose not to pursue a rule of reason claim against the gasoline companies.1 89
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Texaco
and Shell. 9 0 It concluded that the rule of reason must govern the claim
asserted and that plaintiffs, by eschewing that analysis, had failed to
raise an issue for trial.191 The Ninth Circuit reversed.192 It contended
that the defendants had not proven that Equilon's uniform pricing of
Shell and Texaco branded gasoline was an ancillary trade restraint because they had failed to show that such unified pricing was reasonably
necessary to permit Equilon to achieve its legitimate ends. 193 Absent

184 Id. at 7-8 (holding that the ancillary restraints "doctrine governs the validity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration, such as a business association or
joint venture, on nonventure activities" and that "the pricing decisions of a legitimate joint
venture do not fall within the narrow category of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of
the Sherman Act").
185 Id. at 3-4.
186 Id. at 4, 6 n.1.
187 Id. at 3-4.
188 Id. at 4.
189 Dagher v. Saudi Refining Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The plaintiffs
disclaimed any reliance on the traditional 'rule of reason' test, instead resting their entire
claim on either the per se rule or a 'quick look' theory of liability."), rev'd in part sub nom.
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
1o0See Dagher,547 U.S. at 4.
191 Id.
192 Saudi Refining, 369
193 Id. at

F.3d at 1122-25.

1121-22.

HeinOnline -- 52 B.C. L. Rev. 907 2011

908

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 52:871

such proof, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, there should be no "exception"
to the generally applicable per se rule against horizontal price-fixing. 19 4
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawfully constituted joint venture's pricing of its own products is not per se
illegal.195 As long as the joint venture is not a mere sham, the venture's
pricing decision cannot constitute horizontal price-fixing (i.e., pricefixing among competitors) for the simple reason that the co-venturers
are not competitors when it comes to the activity of their joint venture. 196 Accordingly, the venture's pricing must be challenged under the
rule of reason, not under the per se rule applicable to horizontal pricefixing.197 With respect to the Ninth Circuit's analysis under the ancillary
restraints doctrine, which immunizes certain trade restraints that are
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive integration,198 the Court
clarified that the doctrine governs only "the validity of restrictions imposed ... on nonventure activities."19 9 The ancillary restraints doctrine

has no applicability "where the business practice being challenged involves the core activity of the joint venture itself, namely the pricing of
the very goods produced and sold by [the joint venture]."20 0
Had it been allowed to stand, the Ninth Circuit's analysis would
have generated tremendous error costs. If a lawfully constituted joint
venture's product pricing, which is a "core" business activity, were subject to the per se rule then virtually every post-formation decision of
the venture would be subject to attack.201 Any decision that could be
construed as involving output reduction, price setting, judgments about
product marketing, or a limitation on product or service features would
put venture participants at risk for automatic antitrust liability. To avoid
application of the per se rule, which applies to horizontal agreements
to reduce output, to fix prices, to divide markets, and to refuse to compete on product features, the venturers would have to show that the
decision at issue was necessary for the venture to accomplish its objec-

194 Id. at 1116 ("We think the exception the defendants seek is inconsistent with the
Sherman Act as it has been understood to date.").
195 Dagher,547 U.S. at 8.
196 Id. at 6.
19 Id. at 7.

198 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 194-96.
' Dagher,547 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
200 Id. at 7-8.
201

See id.
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tive. 202 Failure to do so might subject participants to immediate liability
and treble damages.
Such an approach could not help but chill joint venture activity. A
chilling effect would be costly indeed because competitor joint ventures
frequently benefit consumers by enabling participants to create new
products, enhance productive efficiency by exploiting economies of
scope and scale, achieve synergies through pooling complementary
assets or skills, and lower transaction costs. 203 The Dagher Court's holding and its clarification of the ancillary restraints doctrine therefore
rein in a particularly costly species of Type I error.204
In addition, Dagheris likely to reduce the decision costs associated
with challenges to the conduct of competitor joint ventures. By insulating the core business decisions of a lawfully constituted joint venture,
the decision forces consolidation of concerns about joint activity into
the earlier proceeding on the joint venture's legality. 205 It avoids multiple proceedings every time the joint venture engages in some core activity that could be construed as unnecessary to the venture's ultimate
objective. 206
B. Decisions ConcerningProceduresand Immunities
Like its decisions on substantive antitrust liability rules, the Roberts
Court's three decisions on antitrust procedures and immunities have
reflected decision theory concerns.
1. Credit Suisse and Regulatory Preclusion
Justice Breyer, who has long advocated crafting antitrust rules in
light of the limits of antitrust, authored the majority opinion in Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing.207 Unsurprisingly, the Court explic202 See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2.22 (2010 ed.) (cataloguing horizontal restraints deemed to be per se illegal and outlining the standard necessary
to avoid a per se analysis).
20s See HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 194, 201-03, 205, 211-14 (describing competitor
joint ventures and the various benefits they deliver).
204 See Dagher,547 U.S. at 6-8.
205 See id. at 6-7.
206 See id. at 6-8.
207 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007); see Town of Concord, Mass. v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d
17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[A]ntitrust rules are court-administered rules. They must be clear
enough for lawyers to explain them to clients. They must be administratively workable and
therefore cannot always take account of every complex economic circumstance or qualification."); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983). Authoring the majority opinion in Barry Wright,Justice Breyer stated:
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itly embraced decision-theoretic reasoning in holding that antitrust
challenges to certain securities marketing practices were implicitly precluded by the federal securities laws. 2 08
The plaintiffs in Credit Suisse were investors who had purchased
newly issued securities in initial public offerings (IPOs).209 Various investment banks had formed underwriting syndicates to help issuing
companies sell their newly issued securities, and the plaintiffs claimed
that the syndicates had unlawfully agreed with one another not to sell
shares of a popular new issue to any buyer who would not commit to:
buy additional shares of the security in the future at escalating prices,
buy less desirable securities in addition to the popular issue, or pay the
underwriter an unusually high commission on subsequent security purchases. 210 The defendant banks moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the federal securities laws impliedly preclude application of
the antitrust laws to the conduct in question. 211The district court agreed
and dismissed the claim, but the Second Circuit reversed.2 12
Reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court first reviewed its
precedents addressing the relation of the securities laws to the antitrust
laws. 213 Those precedents, the Court observed, establish that the securities laws implicitly preclude an antitrust complaint when there is a "clear
repugnancy" between the complaint and the securities laws or, put differently, when the two are "clearly incompatible." 214 The precedents also
prescribe four factors that are critical in determining whether such incompatibility exists: (1) whether the challenged practice lies squarely
within an area of financial market activity that the securities laws seek to
Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may
well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve .... [W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type
of undesirable pricing behavior end up discouraging legitimate price competition.
724 F.2d at 234.
20 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285.
209 Id. at 267.
210 Id.

211 See id. at 270; In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Lit., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499
(S.D.N.Y 2003).
212 Billing v. Credit Suisse First Bos. LTD, 426 F.3d 130, 170, 172 (2d Cir. 2005); IPO
Antitrust Litigation, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25.
213 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 271-75 (discussing United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 729-30 (1975); Gordon v. N.Y Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689
(1975); Silversv. N.Y Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963)).
214 Id. at 275.
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regulate; (2) whether an administrative body has legal authority to supervise the practice; (3) whether the regulator has, in fact, exercised its
regulatory authority; and (4) whether permitting the antitrust action
would risk conflicting guidance, requirements, or standards. 215
With respect to the complaint before it, the Court concluded that
no one could "reasonably dispute" that the first three factors favored
implicit preclusion. 216 Indeed, the activities in question lay squarely
within the sphere of securities law regulation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had statutory authority to supervise the
challenged activities, and the SEC had, in fact, exercised its authority to
regulate the type of conduct at issue.217 The only question before the
Court, then, was whether the plaintiffs complaint threatened to create
a conflict between antitrust and securities law.218
The plaintiffs maintained that their lawsuit (and others like it)
could not be incompatible with securities law concerns because the
SEC had already disapproved of the complained-of activities and would
likely continue to do so into the foreseeable future.2 19 Thus, they contended, there could be no significant downside to allowing them to
pursue their antitrust claims. In rejecting that view and concluding that
maintenance of the antitrust action at issue would be incompatible with
the securities laws, the Court made little effort to identify specific
points of conflict between the securities and antitrust laws. Instead, it
invoked decision theory concerns, comparing the expected error costs
of permitting the type of action at issue to the expected error costs of
deeming such actions to be implicitly precluded.2 20
Contrary to the plaintiffs' claim that there could be no downside
to antitrust lawsuits attacking anticompetitive conduct of which the SEC
had already disapproved, the Supreme Court saw a cause for concern:
215 Id.

216

Id.

217 Id. at

276-77. The Court explained:

[T]he activities in question here-the underwriters' efforts jointly to promote
and to sell newly issued securities-is central to the proper functioning of
well-regulated capital markets.... [T] he law grants the SEC authority to su[T]he SEC has continuously
pervise all of the activities here in question .....
exercised its legal authority to regulate conduct of the general kind now at issue.
Id. at 277.
218 Id. ("Is an antitrust suit such as this likely to prove practically incompatible with the
SEC's administration of the Nation's securities laws?").
219 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 278.
220 Id. at 279-84.
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potential antitrust condemnation of socially beneficial securities marketing practices (Type I errors).221 Even if one assumes, as the Court
did, that the SEC has disapproved of the complained-of conduct and
will likely continue to do so in the future, antitrust actions based on
securities marketing practices are prone to generate false convictions. 222 The Court pointed to four factors that create potential for such
errors. The first is the fine distinctions between permissible and impermissible conduct in the securities marketing context.22 3 Second is
the need for securities-related expertise, which generalist courts lack, to
draw these distinctions and to determine whether in fact the SEC's disapproval of a complained-of practice is likely to remain permanent. 224
Third is the fact that the evidence presented in antitrust lawsuits arising
from securities marketing practices would likely permit contradictory,
but mutually reasonable, inferences.22 5 The fourth is the high risk of
inconsistent results as antitrust plaintiffs "bring lawsuits throughout the
Nation in dozens of different courts with different nonexpert judges
and different nonexpert juries."2 2 6 The Court asserted the combination
of these factors "make mistakes unusually likely" in this context:
Together these factors mean there is no practical way to confine antitrust suits so that they challenge only activity of the
kind the investors seek to target, activity that is presently unlawful and will likely remain unlawful under the securities law.
Rather, these factors suggest that antitrust courts are likely to
make unusually serious mistakes in this respect. And the
threat of antitrust mistakes, i.e., results that stray outside the
narrow bounds that plaintiffs seek to set, means that underwriters must act in ways that will avoid not simply conduct that
the securities law forbids (and will likely continue to forbid),
221

Id. at 279-82.

222 See id.
223 Id. at 279 ("[O]nly a fine, complex, detailed line separates activity that the SEC
permits or encourages (for which respondents must concede antitrust immunity) from
activity that the SEC must (and inevitably will) forbid (and which, on respondents' theory,
should be open to antitrust attack).").
24 Id. at 280-81 ("[T]o distinguish what is forbidden from what is allowed requires an
understanding of just when, in relation to services provided, a commission is 'excessive,'
indeed, so 'excessive' that it will remain permanently forbidden. And who but the SEC itself
could do so with confidence?") (internal citation omitted).
225 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 281 ("[E]vidence tending to show unlawful antitrust activity
and evidence tending to show lawful securities marketing activity may overlap, or prove
identical.").
226

Id.
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but also a wide range of joint conduct that the securities law
permits or encourages (but which they fear could lead to an
antitrust lawsuit and the risk of treble damages).227
Having thus disposed of the first part of the formula for estimating
the cost of Type I errors, the Court turned to the second component:
the magnitude of losses from such mistakes. It observed that false positives would create significant social costs in the context at hand, for
"the role that joint conduct plays in respect to the marketing of IPOs,
along with the important role IPOs themselves play in relation to the
effective functioning of capital markets means that the securitiesrelated costs of mistakes is unusually high."2 28 The Court thus concluded that the error costs of permitting the antitrust action at issue
would likely be high.229
The Court then compared those expected costs to the expected
error costs of deeming the action to be implicitly precluded. 230 Any errors resulting from such a decision would, of course, consist of Type II
errors, false acquittals of practices that would have been condemned
had antitrust actions been permitted. The Court concluded that the
costs associated with such errors would likely be relatively small. First, if
the conduct is already forbidden by the SEC, as the plaintiffs assumed,
either the SEC or private investors could bring securities lawsuits to
stop the offensive practices. 231 Moreover, there is less need for antitrust
to intervene to thwart anticompetitive practices because the securities
laws already require the SEC "to take account of competitive considerations when it creates securities-related policy and embodies it in rules
and regulations."2 32 Accordingly, antitrust liability in this context adds
little social value, and the costs of reining in its reach so that it fails to
capture some anticompetitive conduct would be relatively low.233
227 Id. at 282; see also id. ("This kind of problem exists to some degree in respect to other antitrust lawsuits. But here the factors we have mentioned make mistakes unusually
likely (a matter relevant to Congress' determination of which institution should regulate a
particular set of market activities).").
228
229

Id.
See id.

Id. at 282-84.
Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283 ("For one thing, the SEC actively enforces the rules
and regulations that forbid the conduct in question. For another, ... investors harmed by
underwriters' unlawful practices may bring lawsuits and obtain damages under the securities law."); see supra note 219 and accompanying text.
232 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283.
233 Id. (observing that "any enforcement-related need for an antitrust lawsuit is unusually small" in this context because SEC involvement "makes it somewhat less necessary to
rely upon antitrust actions to address anticompetitive behavior").
230

231

HeinOnline -- 52 B.C. L. Rev. 913 2011

914

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 52:871

It was thus a comparison of the costs of too much antitrust intervention versus too little that led the Court to conclude that there was
an inevitable conflict between the sort of antitrust action at issue and
the effective implementation of the securities laws. 234 Although the
Court did not expressly analyze likely decision costs, consideration of
such costs would only have bolstered its conclusion. A legal regime
permitting plaintiffs to choose between two types of lawsuits (involving
very different substantive doctrine, procedural rules, and damages
formulae) in challenging a single set of business practices would almost
certainly involve higher decision costs than a regime dealing with such
practices under a single body of law. Thus, the reasoning of Credit Suisse
explicitly embraces decision theory's error cost analysis, and the holding of the case comports with decision theory as a whole.
2. Twombly and Parallel Conduct
Rivaling Leegin as the Roberts Court antitrust decision most perceived to be pro-business, anti-consumer, and radical is Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly. 235 Twombly's infamy likely stems from the fact that it
dealt with pleading standards, an issue in every lawsuit. And the Supreme Court later upped the ante by expressly extending Twombly's
plausibility requirement beyond the antitrust conspiracy context.23 6
Putting aside Twombly's effect on pleading standards generally and focusing solely on the decision's implications for antitrust lawsuits, the
decision appears to have been largely motivated by, and is wholly consistent with, principles of decision theory.
The narrow issue in Twombly was whether a plaintiff adequately
pleads the agreement element of a Sherman Act section 1 claim merely
by alleging parallel conduct and asserting that a conspiracy existed.2 37
234

Id. at 284. The Court summarized its reasoning as follows:
In sum, an antitrust action in this context is accompanied by a substantial risk
of injury to the securities markets [high Type I error costs] and by a diminished need for antitrust enforcement to address anticompetitive conduct [low
Type II error costs]. Together these considerations indicate a serious conflict
between, on the one hand, application of the antitrust laws and, on the other,
proper enforcement of the securities law.

Id.
235 550 U.S. at 549; see Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U.
PA. L. REv. 473, 476 (2010) ("Scholars have been largely critical of [Twombly]"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading,49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 432 (2008) (noting that Twombly is a
remarkable departure from established doctrine").
236 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-49.
237 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-49.
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The plaintiffs in the case were consumers of local telecommunications
services who sued the defendants, regional telephone companies
known as Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs") for allegedly
entering two competition-limiting agreements: (1) to impede efforts by
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs") to enter the ILECs'
markets, and (2) to refrain from entering each others' markets. 238 In
attempting to allege these two agreements, the plaintiffs averred that
the defendants had uniformly followed the same patterns of opposing
CLECs and failing to enter other ILECs' markets. 23 9 The plaintiffs then
baldly stated that defendants, having engaged in such parallel conduct,
had entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy.240 The problem was that the parallel conduct alleged was as consistent with unilateral conduct as with an agreement.24 1 Each ILEC had an independent
incentive both to oppose CLECs' entrance into its market, and not to
disrupt the traditional market divisions by entering others' markets. 242
Plaintiffs understood that mere parallel conduct and an assertion
of conspiracy would not enable them to survive a motion for summary
judgment.243 At a minimum, they would have to produce evidence
tending to exclude unilateral, self-interested conduct as a basis for the
ILEC's parallel conduct. 2 " They maintained, though, that they need
not set forth facts tending to exclude non-collusive explanations for
parallel conduct at the pleading stage.2 45 In support of that position,
they cited the Supreme Court's statement in Conley v. Gibson that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
Id. at 549-51.
Id. at 550-51 (noting that plaintiffs had alleged "that the ILECs 'engaged in parallel
conduct' in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs"). The
Court observed that the ILECs' purported agreements to avoid competing against each
other were "to be inferred from the ILECs' common failure" to enter each other's markets. Id.
240 See id. at 551 & n.2 (quoting Complaint 11 51, 64, Twombly v. Bell Ad. Corp., 313 F.
Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-10220). "Although in form a few stray statements
speak directly of agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions resting on
the prior allegations." Id. at 564.
241 Id. at 566.
242 Id. at 566-68.
243 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 ("Plaintiffs do not, of course, dispute the requirement of
plausibility and the need for something more than merely parallel behavior [to survive a
defendant's motion for summaryjudgment.]").
244 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1986);
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 465; Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540-41 (1954).
245 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560-61.
238
239
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support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."246 Conceding
that a literal reading of this statement from Conley would prevent dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, since they could later prove some set of
undisclosed facts that would tend to exclude unilateral action as the
explanation for the defendants' parallel conduct, the Court abrogated
Conley's "no set of facts" standard.24 7 It further held that a Sherman Act
section 1 complaint should be dismissed if all it alleges is parallel conduct coupled with a bald assertion of conspiracy.248
Twombly's holding on section 1 pleading standards comports with
decision theory's overarching prescription to minimize the sum of error
and decision costs. In terms of error costs, permitting such plaintiffs'
complaints to proceed to discovery could be disastrous. Plaintiffs' lawyers are well aware that antitrust discovery can impose huge costs and
that defendants frequently settle antitrust actions to avoid such costs and
the risk of treble damages. Both the likelihood and magnitude of errors
would have been high in Twombly because the precedent would have
encouraged plaintiffs' lawyers to search out parallel business conduct
like the failure to pursue some business opportunity, baldly assert that
there was an "agreement" to engage in such conduct, prepare onerous
discovery requests, and hope to extract a settlement. 249 Decision costs
also would have been high because unfounded antitrust conspiracy
claims would have to be dealt with in costly summary judgment proceedings rather than via relatively cheap motions to dismiss. 250
Compared to the error and decision costs that would have resulted
had the Twombly plaintiffs been allowed to proceed with their claim, the
error and decision costs created by the Court's holding are likely to be
lower. Any errors resulting from the Court's holding will consist of false
negatives-that is, improper dismissals under Twombly of meritorious
conspiracy claims. Plaintiffs can avoid dismissal under Twombly if they
allege either an actual agreement or consciously parallel business behavior coupled with facts suggesting that the parallel conduct is more
likely a product of agreement than unilateral action. 25 1 Therefore the
246355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
247 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 ("[Alfter puzzling the profession for 50 years, [Conley's]
famous ['no set of facts'] observation has earned its retirement.").
248 Id. at 569-70.
249 Id. at 567-70.
250 See id.
251 Id. at 569-70; see Elhauge, supra note 1, at 71. For example, a plaintiff could avoid
dismissal by making an economically plausible assertion that the conduct at issue would
not make economic sense for the defendant unless it had reached an understanding with

the other firms that they would all follow the same course of conduct. See Elhauge, supra
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only antitrust conspiracy claims likely to be significantly impeded by
Twombly's pleading requirements are those that involve no known
agreement and no known "plus factors" suggesting a collusive explanation for parallel conduct. 252 Although this is not necessarily an insignificant set of potential collusion claims, it seems likely that pre-complaint
investigation of legitimate claims would usually reveal either sufficient
facts to allege an actual agreement or economic factors tending to exclude the possibility that the parallel conduct resulted from independent, unilateral action. Moreover, any judgment that a complaint was
inadequate under Twombly would likely be entered without prejudice,
so plaintiffs (and others similarly situated) could continue to monitor
the situation and file suit if and when they uncovered facts suggesting
an actual agreement or establishing plus factors. 253 Given that cartels
are fragile and generally require some policing efforts, it is likely that
plaintiffs monitoring genuine collusion would eventually discover facts
that, when pled, would allow meritorious claims to proceed. 254
Thus, the error costs resulting from Twombly's holding, although
perhaps not insignificant, are likely less than those that would have resulted had the Supreme Court held as plaintiffs desired.255 Moreover,
the decision costs associated with the Twombly rule are likely less than
those that would have been imposed under the alternative holding.
Although Twombly may have the effect of forcing multiple complaints
and motions to dismiss, it avoids the far greater costs associated with
protracted discovery and expensive summary judgment proceedings to
dispose of meritless collusion claims based solely on consciously parallel
conduct and conclusory conspiracy allegations.
In addition to Twombly's holding on the pleading standards governing antitrust conspiracy claims, another aspect of the decision, one
concerning substantive liability standards under Sherman Act section 1,
similarly comports with decision theory.25 6 As Einer Elhauge has observed, Twombly clarified a point that "was widely understood before,
but surprisingly had never been explicitly decided in prior Supreme
note 1, at 71 ("[T]he requisite additional evidence could be provided not only by direct
evidence of a conspiracy, but also by evidence that indicates that the parallel conduct either was implausible without an explicit agreement or followed common invitations or
secret meetings.").
252 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70.
253 See id. at 561-64.
254 See Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. at 727 ("Cartels are neither easy to form nor
easy to maintain.").
255 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-52.
256 Id. at 568.
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Court decisions," namely, that mere "interdependent parallel conduct,
or mere oligopolistic coordination, does not suffice to show an antitrust
conspiracy under U.S. law."257 The Court clarified that point in concluding that no actionable agreement would arise from the ILECs' uniform decision not to enter each other's markets but instead to "sit[]
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing." 258
Over the years, prominent antitrust scholars, including Judge
Richard A. Posner and Herbert Hovenkamp, have asserted that courts
should construe section 1's agreement requirement in a more "economic," less "lawyerly" fashion, so as to capture instances of oligopolistic coordination. 259 The key difficulties with such an approach lie in
giving guidance to oligopolists about what is allowed and forbidden,
and in articulating administrable means by which courts may identify
tacit collusion. The first matter is difficult because firms in oligopolistic
markets inevitably know at the time they set their prices that those prices are interdependent, and it is thus difficult to define a prohibition in
a way that notifies them of how they must behave. 260 The second matter
is difficult because legal parallel conduct resulting from competition
frequently resembles illegal tacit collusion.
Judge Posner proposed that courts determine the existence of actionable tacit collusion by: (1) analyzing the structure of the market at
issue to see if it is "propitious for the emergence of collusion"; (2) examining various pieces of economic evidence that indicate whether tacit collusion is in fact occurring; and (3) on the basis of these two examinations, making a gestalt-like determination as to whether collusion
is occurring. 261 Although it sounds simple enough, implementation of
the suggested approach would actually be quite complicated. For example, Posner suggests that courts consider seventeen factors in their
examination of market structure (step one), and he lists fourteen factors that would suggest the existence of actual collusion (step two).262
See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 71; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-54.
258 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 568.
259 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 126-36; POSNER, supra note 15, at 69-93; Richard A.
Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1563-66
(1969).
260 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 71; Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 656 (1962).
261 POSNER, supra note 15, at 69, 93-100.
262 Id. at 69-93. The seventeen factors of step one are whether: (1) the "[m]arket [is]
concentrated on the selling side"; (2) there is "[n]o fringe of small sellers"; (3) there is
"[ilnelastic demand at [the] competitive price"; (4) "[e]ntry takes a long time"; (5) the
"[b]uying side of [the] market [is] unconcentrated"; (6) the product is standard; (7) the
product is nondurable; (8) "[t]he principal firms sell at the same level in the chain of distri257
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In light of this complexity, Hovenkamp has sought to distance himself
from the details of Posner's proposal. 263 He has not offered a workable
alternative, however.2 6 This is not surprising, for it is nearly impossible
to craft a legal rule that will accurately characterize highly subtle business behavior while remaining easy to implement.2 65
The upshot is that attempts to police tacit collusion under section
1 are likely to involve high error costs (as competitive acts that lead to
similar business practices are deemed collusive, and firms respond by
altering their behavior from the competitive norm) and high decision
costs (as generalist courts are forced to grapple with highly subtle, economically complex, multi-faceted tests such as those proffered by Judge
Posner). Sticking to the traditional "lawyerly" understanding of agreement may well allow some collusion to go unpunished. But collusion is
always difficult to sustain, and many facilitating practices-any that are
adopted via agreement-are already regulated under the lawyerly understanding of agreement, so the costs of false negatives are not likely
bution"; (9) "[p]rice competition [is] more important [in the relevant market] than other
forms of competition"; (10) there is a "[h]igh ratio of fixed to variable costs"; (11) the firms
face "[slimilar cost structures and production processes"; (12) "[d]emand [is] static or declining over time"; (13) "[p]rices can be changed quickly"; (14) "[s]ealed bidding" is used;
(15) the "[m]arket is local"; (16) the firms in the market employ "[c]ooperative practices";
and (17) "[t]he industry's antitrust 'record'" suggests attempted collusion. Id. at 69-79 (typeface altered).
The fourteen factors of step two are as follows: (1) "[fMixed relative market shares"; (2)
"[in] arketwide price discrimination"; (3) the existence of price information exchanges; (4)
"[r]egional price variations"; (5) whether the firms have submitted identical sealed bids; (6)
abrupt changes of price, output, or capacity in the market; (7) "[i] ndustrywide resale price
maintenance"; (8) whether the market shares of industry leaders are declining; (9) the
"[a] mplitude and fluctuation of price changes"; (10) the elasticity of demand at the market
price; (11) the "[f]evel and pattern of profits"; (12) whether "[m]arket price [is] inversely
correlated with [the] number of firms or elasticity of demand"; (13) the use of "basing-point
pricing"; and (14) the existence of "exclusionary practices." Id. at 79-93 (typeface altered).
263 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 133 (observing that Posner's approach toward
identifying markets conducive to collusion is "more difficult for courts to manage"). Hovenkamp further argues that Posner's approach to identifying the existence of tacit collusion would "pose formidable administrative difficulties." Id. at 134.
264 See Thomas A. Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model, 85 TEx. L. REv. 153, 171
(2006) (reviewing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND ExECuTION (2005)) (analyzing Hovenkamp's discussion of the limitations of the Posner proposal
and his failure to provide an alternative means of identifying facilitating devices that are imposed unilaterally).
265 See id. ("When it comes to tacit collusion, [Hovenkamp] cannot have his cake and
eat it too: he must either approve the sort of complicated inquiry Posner proposes or fall
back on the 'lawyerly' understanding of agreement, which is admittedly inaccurate but
easy to work with."). Business behavior can be subtle, making it difficult to determine if
behavior is tacit collusion or parallel behavior resulting from common competitive considerations. See id.
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to be that great. 26 6 Thus, the Court's now-explicit rejection of oligopolistic coordination as an "agreement" for purposes of Sherman Act section 1 likely reduces the sum of decision and error costs.267 It seems,
then, that both the express holding of Twombly and its implicit clarification of what constitutes a horizontal agreement are consistent with decision theory.268
3. American Needle and the Intra-Enterprise Immunity Doctrine
The Roberts Court's most recent antitrust decision, American Needie, Inc. v. NFL, resulted in the first Supreme Court judgment in favor of
an antitrust plaintiff since 1992.269 Given that the Court cut back on the
scope of an antitrust immunity, thereby permitting more antitrust actions to proceed to discovery, the decision might at first seem inconsistent with decision theory's focus on the limits of antitrust. 270 But, as
Judd Stone and Joshua Wright have recently explained, American Needle
actually moves antitrust in a direction consistent with decision theory's
instruction to minimize the sum of decision and error costs. 271
At issue in American Needle was whether a vote by the members of
the NFL to authorize an action by a corporate entity they created and
controlled, the National Football League Properties (NFLP), could constitute a contract, combination, or conspiracy for purposes of Sherman
Act section 1.272 In 1963, the members of the NFL established NFLP to
develop, license, and market their intellectual property.2 73 For almost
four decades, NFLP granted nonexclusive licenses, permitting multiple
manufacturers and vendors to produce and sell team-branded apparel. 274 Plaintiff American Needle received such a nonexclusive li-

266 See supra note 254 and accompanying text; see also Lambert, supra note 264, at 171
(observing that courts routinely condemn cartel facilitators adopted by agreement, "reasoning that the agreement element ... is satisfied by the agreement to employ the facilitator").
267 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-54.
268 Id. at 553-54, 569-70.
269 130 S. Ct. at 2216-17. Prior to American Needle, the last Supreme Court decision in
favor of an antitrust plaintiff was Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., almost
twenty years prior. 504 U.S. 451, 451 (1992).
270American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216-17.
271 SeeJudd E. Stone &Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust FormalismIs Dead! Long Live Antitrust
Formalism! Some Implications ofAmerican Needle v. NFL, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 369, 370-

72.
272 American
273 Id.
274

Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208.
at 2207.

Id.
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cense.27 5 In 2000, the teams voted to authorize NFLP to grant exclusive
licenses, and NFLP granted Reebok International Ltd. a ten-year exclusive license to produce and sell trademarked headwear for the NFL
teams.2 76 NFLP then declined to renew American Needle's nonexclusive
license. American Needle sued, claiming that the agreements between
the NFL, its teams, NFLP, and Reebok violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.27 7
In defending against American Needle's section 1 claim, the defendants asserted that they were incapable of conspiring "because they
are a single economic enterprise, at least with respect to the conduct
challenged."2 78 The district court agreed, holding that the NFL, NFLP,
and respective NFL teams qualified as a "single entity" and therefore
could not conspire in violation of section 1.279 On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, carefully limiting its
holding to whether the defendants were acting as a single entity with
respect to the particular conduct at issue, the licensing of teams' intellectual property.28 0 American Needle then petitioned the Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari on grounds that the defendants were capable of conspiring with respect to the challenged conduct.28 1 Somewhat
surprisingly, the defendants also petitioned for writ of certiorari on
grounds that the Seventh Circuit should have held more broadly that
the NFL and other sports leagues act as a single entity generally, not
2 82
just with respect to some of their conduct. Disregarding the Solicitor
General's advice to deny certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted the
appeal, characterizing the issue before it as
whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a
"contract, combination ... , or conspiracy" as defined by § 1
Id.
Id.
277 Id.
278 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208.
279 Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942-943 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
280 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that NFL football itself must be produced collectively, that promotion of such
jointly produced football involves a shared economic interest (not independent interests),
that promotion includes the licensing of intellectual property, and that the teams' joint
licensing through NFLP therefore failed to deprive the market of independent centers of
decision making. Id.
281 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08661).
282 See Brief for the NFL Respondents at i, American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08661).
275
276
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of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, or ... whether the alleged
activity by the NFL respondents "must be viewed as that of a
single enterprise for purpose of § 1."283
American Needle therefore afforded the Court an opportunity to reconsider the contours of the "intra-enterprise immunity" doctrine. 2 8
That doctrine recognizes that even the obviously unilateral conduct of
individual business firms often involves some literal agreements like
those between agents of the firm, but generally should not be considered concerted conduct for purposes of Sherman Act section 1.285 The
point of the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine is to insulate from liability those literal agreements, such as understandings between a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, that cannot really reduce
competition by removing independent centers of decision making from
the economy and thereby potentially consolidating market power.286
In 1984, the Supreme Court most fully articulated the intraenterprise immunity doctrine in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., in which the Court had to decide whether a parent corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary were capable of "conspiring" for purposes of section 1.287 In answering that question in the negative, the
Court began by noting two fundamental and distinct screens inherent
in the Sherman Act: section 1 prohibits only "concerted" conduct but
does not require that the defendant(s) possess market power; section 2
reaches "unilateral" conduct but generally requires actual market power or a dangerous probability of attaining it."8 Because section 1 lacks
section 2's market power screen, the Court reasoned, it is important to
honor its concerted conduct screen by finding a section 1 violation only
when a literal combination has "deprive [d] the marketplace of independent centers of decision-making" by joining two entities that would

283 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208; see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 1, American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-661).
284 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
285 See id. at 2209-11.
286 Id. at 2211.
287 467 U.S. 752, 755 (1984). The defendants, Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary, collectively contacted customers and suppliers to discourage them from doing
business with the plaintiff, Independence Tube. Id. at 756-57. Based on that conduct, Independence Tube sued Copperweld and its subsidiary, alleging that they had engaged in a
conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of Sherman Act section 1. Id. at 755-57. The
defendants maintained that they were incapable of conspiring. See id. at 755-58.
288 Id. at 767-69 (distinguishing between sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Act).
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otherwise be expected to pursue their own, perhaps divergent, interests. 289
When it comes to a parent corporation and the wholly owned subsidiary that it fully controls and whose gain and loss it captures in full,
the Court reasoned, divergent interests are impossible.290 Thus, the
Court concluded, a literal combination between a parent corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary does not deprive the market of independent centers of decision making and thus cannot constitute a contract, combination, or conspiracy for purposes of Sherman Act section 1.291
Copperweld was a bit of a mixed bag. As Stone and Wright have explained, the Court's desire to eliminate liability under Sherman Act
section 1 for some literal combinations was laudable.2 92 When a literal
combination involves no actual or threatened market power and does
not deprive the market of any independent center of economic decision making, it is highly unlikely to harm consumers. 293 Instead, the
literal combination has probably been effected because it is efficient.
Assigning liability for such combinations would thwart efficient relationships without providing any benefit for consumers.29 4 A Copperweld
approach that allows early termination of conspiracy claims premised
on harmless intra-enterprise combinations thus seems desirable from a
decision-theoretic perspective.
Copperweld was a mess, though, in terms of its direction on how to
identify literal combinations that should be immune from section 1
scrutiny.295 In concluding that Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring, the Court reasoned that

289Id. at 769.
290Id. at 771-72.
291 Id.

292 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 375.
2
2

See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771-72.
See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 375. Stone & Wright explain:
Copperweld immunity provided an easily articulated rationale that mapped onto straightforward economic intuition: a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary neither could nor should be expected to behave as potential competitors
might. Rival firms predicating Section 1 claims on wholly internal behavior
are therefore unlikely to increase net consumer welfare by doing so, and
courts should be unwilling to entertain these claims.

Id.
29 See id. at 375-81 (discussing difficulties resulting from Copperweld's imprecise formulation of a test for identifying entities incapable of conspiring).
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[a] parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete
unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate;
their general corporate actions are guided or determined not
by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.296
Although this is all true, the Court created some confusion by simultaneously emphasizing the "unity of interest" of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary and the fact that the two entities are subject to common control. 297 Implementation difficulties were bound to arise because
unity of interest and common control need not follow each other. Firms
with unified interests may lack common control, and commonly controlled business divisions may diverge in their interests. 29 8
In applying Copperweld, lower courts generally latched onto the
"unity of interests" language, looking to see if the parties to the purported agreement face any divergence in their incentives. 299 This
proved problematic. For one thing, focusing on whether the combining units share a unity of interests led to significant divergence in outcomes.3 00 Some courts construed unity of interests broadly, holding, for
example, that pure sister corporations, or wholly owned subsidiaries of
a common parent, merit Copperweld immunitys01 Broad holdings also
determined that a franchisor and its franchisees could be a single entity, that separately owned franchisees may constitute a single entity,
and that one firm's ownership of a bare majority of the other's stock
creates a single entity.30 2
296Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.

See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 375-76.
See id. As Stone and Wright observe, "Members of an oligopolistic cartel certainly
enjoy a 'unity of interests' at least in the short-run; various directors of a division within a
single corporation hold at least partially divergent interests with regards to future business
strategies for their divisions and the company as a whole." Id. at 375.
2 Id. at 376-78.
3oo Id. at 377-78.
3o1 See Davidson & Schaaf, Inc. v. Liberty Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 868, 871
(8th Cir.
1995) (holding that two wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent cannot conspire
under section 1); Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Prod. Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that a group of individuals with joint ownership over a parent company and its two subsidiaries have section 1 immunity).
302 See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
("Because the Ritz theaters share common owners and leadership and operate as a single
entity, we hold that there can be no Sherman Act conspiracy between them."); Williams v.
Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1030-31 (D. Nev. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that "[t]he cornerstone of ... § 1 violation-competition between entities-does
not exist in this case" between franchisor and franchisee); Novatel Commc'n, Inc. v. Cellular Tel. Supply, Inc., No. Civ.A.C85-2674A, 1986 WL 798475, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1986)
('The 51% ownership retained by Novatel-Canada assured it of full control over Carcom
29

298
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Other courts were disinclined to find a unity of interests. Some
ruled, for example, that sibling corporations sharing a common parent
are not a single entity.30 3 Others held that a parent and subsidiary corporation are not a single entity if more than a de minimis percentage of
the subsidiary's stock is owned by someone other than the parent. 304
In addition to creating implementation difficulties, the focus on
whether business units share a unity of interests ultimately seems inapposite to whether they are, in reality, a single economic entity. 305 As
Judge Easterbrook has noted, there are often incentive conflicts among
agents within what is obviously a single firm, and there is frequently no
divergence in interests within obvious cartelS. 306 As Stone and Wright
explain, a more economically sensible approach would endeavor to
immunize from antitrust liability those literal combinations involving
parties who are subject to common control.3 07 Such an approach would
correspond to the economic understanding of the firm, which consists
of a body in which resources are allocated according to managerial fiat
to reduce transaction costs, avoid hold-up problems resulting from asset-specific investments, and create performance incentives. 30 8
That, however, is not the tack the Court took in American Needle.
Instead, it disregarded control questions and focused exclusively on
whether the defendants possessed a complete unity of interests.3 09 In
holding that the NFL members could conspire in jointly authorizing
NFLP to grant exclusive licenses, the Court emphasized that "[a]lthough
NFL teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand,
they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in
licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned."3 10 The Court then
observed that although "[c]ommon interests in the NFL brand partially

and assured it could intervene at any time that Carcom ceased to act in its best interests.
Thus, Carcom and Novatel-Canada are incapable of conspiring for purposes of § I of the
Sherman Act.").
303 See Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1486 (D. Or.
1987).
304 See Leaco Enter., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605, 608-09 (D. Or. 1990).
305 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 379-80.
306 See Chicago Prof I Sports, Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Even a
single firm contains many competing interests. ... Conflicts are endemic in any multistage firm . ... "); supra note 298 and accompanying text.
307 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 379-80.
30 See id.
30 See id. at 393-95.
310 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added).
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unite the economic interests of the parent firms ... the teams still have
distinct, potentially competing interests."3 11
The Court was not persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
that because a joint venture is necessary to produce NFL football, promotion of the jointly produced product, including the licensing of intellectual property, should be deemed unilateral conduct of the single
joint venture.31 2 It stated that "[t] he justification for cooperation is not
relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action,"313 and it emphasized that "necessity of cooperation" does not
necessarily "transform[] concerted action into independent action."314
Rather, the need for cooperation is relevant to (1) whether concerted
conduct is evaluated under the rule of reason and (2) how that conduct fares under the rule.3 15 Indeed, the Court emphasized that although the NFL members' joint conduct would not be exempt from
liability under the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine, it might still pass
muster under a rule of reason analysis.3 16
In sum, the Court seemed to reason that only a complete unity of
interests will invoke the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine, that the
need for joint conduct to produce a product is not enough to render
that conduct unilateral, but that the rule of reason may acquit joint actions that appear to be output-enhancing.
This analysis comports with decision theory and displays a sensitivity to the limits of antitrust even though it weakens the degree to which
the intra-enterprise immunity screen may weed out meritless antitrust
actions and permits more claims to proceed to costly discovery. To see
why this is so, consider the justices' questions at oral argument. As
Stone and Wright observe, the oral argument centered on the relative
costs and benefits of intra-enterprise immunity and rule of reason adjudication as alternative means of screening out meritless antitrust conspiracy claims.3 17 They assert that the Court "to its credit was very much
focused on the 'compared to what?' question," apparently seeking to
construct screening mechanisms in a manner that would minimize
311 Id.

(alteration omitted) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
supra note 278 and accompanying text.
313 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2214.
312 See
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id.

at 2216-17.

317 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 391 ("At oral argument, the Court repeatedly
stressed its concerns with the relative efficiency and utility of Rule of Reason analysis, including various filters that might apply to screen out low-quality claims, versus the theoretically simpler-but heretofore unpredictable-Copperweld screen.").
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administrative and error costs. 318 In the end, the Court surmised that
Copperweld, which had generated tremendous confusion among the
lower courts and had led to extensive and costly disputes over singleentity status, was not a very cost-effective screening mechanism. 19
There are, however, alternative methods for screening out antitrust conspiracy claims involving related entities whose combination
would not seem to threaten consumer harm. The most obvious one,
the focus of the justices' questioning, is the rule of reason itself.320
Since the time Copperweld was decided, courts and commentators have
provided some "structure" to the rule of reason as applied to joint ventures, making the rule easier to administer, more predictable, and less
prone to generate errors and their associated costs.3 21
Id. at 392.
See id. at 392-93.
320 See id. at 391-92 (describing questions from oral argument).Judge Michael Boudin,
who has taught antitrust at Harvard, had suggested that the rule of reason could substitute
for intra-enterprise immunity as a means of weeding out meritless antitrust conspiracy
claims based on complex business relationships that seem not to threaten harm. See Fraser
v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002). Having explained that many
antitrust conspiracy cases present hybrid business arrangements somewhere between a
single company and a cooperative arrangement among competitors, he wrote:
318
319

The law at this point could develop along either or both of two different
lines. One would expand upon Copperweld to develop functional tests or criteria for shielding (or refusing to shield) such hybrids from section 1 scrutiny
for intra-enterprise arrangements. This would'be a complex task and add a
new layer of analysis; but where the analysis shielded the arrangement it
would serve to cut off similarly difficult, intrusive scrutiny of such intraenterprise activities under extremely generalized rule of reason standards. It
would also prevent claims, clearly inappropriate in our view, under per se rules
or precedents dealing with arrangements between existing independent
competitors.
The other course is to reshape section 1's rule of reason toward a body of
more flexible rules for interdependent multi-party enterprises. Sports leagues
are a primary example but so are common franchising arrangements and
joint ventures that perform specific services for competitors (e.g., a common
purchasing entity.) Certainly the trend of section 1 law has been to soften per
se rules and to recognize the need for accommodation among interdependent enterprises.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
321 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-81 (1999); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117-20 (1984); HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 105-07 (eschewing an
open-ended rule of reason and explaining that economic analysis and modern court decisions support a structured rule of reason). Stephen Calkins has also observed that the rule
of reason has become more predictable and easier to apply since Copperweld was decided:
Back in 1984 when Copperweld was decided, the Solicitor General pointed to
the spectre of near-certain illegality that followed from finding a Section 1
conspiracy. Today, much of what was then viewed as almost automatically ille-
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Of course, rule of reason adjudication occurs after costly discovery,
so the rule may not provide the optimal device for screening out patently meritless conspiracy claims. There is, though, another screen. As
Stone and Wright emphasize, Twombly's requirement that antitrust conspiracy plaintiffs plead a "plausible" claim, including a plausible theory
of anticompetitive harm, provides an additional mechanism for screening out meritless conspiracy actions.3 22 They explain that "Twombly dismissals indeed satisfy both components of a workable substitute for Copperweld immunity-they both allow for an early [pre-discovery] dismissal
of marginal antitrust cases and force antitrust plaintiffs to articulate
theories of anti-competitive harm grounded in economics."323 Thus, the
advent of a structured, more predictable, and "cheaper" rule of reason,
coupled with more stringent pleading standards, enabled the Court to
jettison another costly screening mechanism. 324 When American Needle is
read, not in isolation but in light of the Court's entire section 1 jurisprudence, it appears to be consistent with an effort to minimize the sum
of decision and error costs related to antitrust adjudication.
III. SOME PREDICTIONS FOR THE

FUTURE

In light of the decision-theoretic perspective that appears to underlie the Roberts Court's antitrust jurisprudence, what can we predict
about the Court's future antitrust decisions? This question is slightly
complicated by the fact that the composition of the Supreme Court has
just recently changed: on August 7, 2010, Justice Elena Kagan was
sworn in to replace retiring Justice John Paul Stevens. 325 That development, though, is unlikely to alter the degree to which the Court em-

gal is considered lawful under the rule of reason. This suggests that Judge
Boudin's approach (as I read it) makes sense: today, there is less need to rely
on expansive applications of Copperweld to permit procompetitive activity to
continue, and there's more freedom to let the rule of reason distinguish the
lawful from the unlawful.
Stephen Calkins, Professor of Law, Wayne State Univ. Sch. of Law, Panel Discussion, Copperweld- The Basics and Beyond (Aug. 28, 2002), in ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2003, at 4,

available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/03/03/copperweld.pdf.
322 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (to survive a motion to dismiss, an antitrust plaintiff
must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"); Stone &
Wright, supra note 271, at 403-06.
323 Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 403.
324 See id. Note that new, more stringent pleading standards require plaintiffs to set
forth a "plausible" theory of anticompetitive harm. See id.
325 See Peter Baker, Kagan Is Sworn in as the Fourth Woman, and 112th Justice, on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 2010, at A13.
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braces the decision-theoretic approach. Even ifJustice Kagan turns out
to oppose the decision-theoretic perspective, she is unlikely to alter the
balance of power on the Court. That is because Justice Stevens, whom
she is replacing, was himself somewhat reluctant to afford decision theory a large role in antitrust adjudication. 2 6 Indeed, he explicitly disavowed error cost analysis in his concurring opinion in the 2007 case of
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,where he wrote:
Surely I would not suggest, as the Court did in Twombly, and as
it does again today, that either the burdens of antitrust litigation or the risk "that antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes," should play any role in the analysis of
the question of law presented in a case such as this. 327
I will therefore proceed on the assumption that the recent change in
Court composition will either strengthen the influence of decision theory (if Justice Kagan turns out to favor such analysis) or leave it unchanged (if she, like her predecessor, is skeptical).
Assuming the Roberts Court stays the course, this Article predicts
that it will abrogate the per se rule against tying and hold that tie-ins
must be evaluated under a rule of reason requiring the plaintiff to
prove substantial tied market foreclosure. The Article also predicts that
the Court will eventually create certain safe harbors for loyalty rebates
and bundled discounts that are, in some sense, "above-cost."
A. Tying
As explained above, tying is currently subject to a quasi-per se rule,
under which a tie-in is per se illegal if: it involves two separate products,
the defendant has market power in the tying product market, and the
tie-in affects a "not insubstantial" dollar volume of commerce in the
tied product market.328 Efficiency-minded antitrust scholars have long
criticized this rule because it condemns even those tie-ins that do not
foreclose a significant percentage of marketing opportunities in the
tied product market, despite the fact that such foreclosure is necessary
to augment the defendant's market power.3 29 Those scholars have thus
contended that tying, like exclusive dealing, should be evaluated under
See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 286-87 (2007) (Stevens,
(quoting id. at 282 (majority opinion)) (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 287.
328 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
29 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, 11 1701, 1703d3; POSNER, supra note 15, at 198.
326

J., concurring)
327
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a rule of reason that focuses on the degree to which the practice forecloses otherwise available marketing opportunities.3 30 Because many
business practices may be alternatively characterized as tie-ins or as instances of exclusive dealing, it makes sense to treat the two practices
under a single liability rule that requires the plaintiff to establish all
prerequisites to market power enhancement, including substantial
market foreclosure.33 1
In 1984, in Jefferson ParishHospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Court
came quite close to adopting a foreclosure-focused rule of reason for
tying, with four concurring justices expressly calling for abrogation of
the per se rule.332 Given economists' relentless criticism of the rule and
the Roberts Court's apparent willingness to upset precedent to align
antitrust doctrine with economic learning, the Court is likely to reconsider this issue in the future.333 If it does so, it will likely be confronted
with a set of arguments defending the quasi-per se rule on the ground
that tying may allow a defendant to price discriminate and thereby extract greater consumer surplus, even if the tie-in could not extend the
scope of the defendant's market power.334 In light of these potential
effects, defenders of the quasi-per se rule would argue, the Court
should maintain the existing tying doctrine so as to protect consumers
from harm.3 35
Looking forward, if the Roberts Court is as committed to decision
theory as the foregoing analysis suggests, it will reject the reasoning of
3so See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 198-206; Christian Ahlborn et al., The Antitrust
Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 287, 291 (2004).
331 SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44-45 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (observing that the tie-in at issue could also be analyzed as exclusive dealing); HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 200-01 (observing that exclusive dealing arrangements
can often be characterized as tying, thereby permitting plaintiffs to take advantage of the
stricter quasi-per se rule).
332 466 U.S. at 27-29 ("The time has therefore come to abandon the 'per se' label."); see
id. at 35 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
333 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887-95 (2007)
(overruling the 1911 Dr. Miles precedent based on economic learning since decision was
rendered); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 89 (2008) (observing that no panelist in an extensive series of hearings on exclusionary practices had endorsed the Supreme Court's
tying rule and that many had criticized it).
3
See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 403-13 (widely noted article discussing the so-called
power effects" of tie-ins in).
s35 Id. at 425. Elhauge observes that if tying's price discrimination and surplus extraction effects are deemed anticompetitive, "the focus on tying market power and tied dollar
amount does not mean that the doctrine fails to require evidence of anticompetitive effects. That focus instead means that tying doctrine correctly requires proof of the elements
necessary to achieve anticompetitive effects." Id.
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the status quo defenders and will hold that tying, like exclusive dealing,
must be evaluated under a foreclosure-focused rule of reason. Price
discrimination, particularly of the metering variety that tying often facilitates, frequently enhances market output and total efficiency by
bringing into the market groups of low-valuation customers who would
not pay the defendant's profit-maximizing, uniform price.336 A defendant can increase its own profits and expand market output by discriminating in favor of those customers and charging them an abovecost price that is below their reservation price. Such a defendant will
also often, though not always, enhance static efficiency by increasing
total surplus of producers and consumers.3 37 Perhaps more importantly,
the freedom to engage in tying-induced price discrimination may promote dynamic efficiencies. By rewarding producers who sell to customers at above-cost prices, price discrimination encourages consumerfriendly efforts to develop new, unique products and to differentiate
products in ways consumers find desirable.33 8
In light of the efficiency benefits tie-ins frequently confer, attempts
to regulate instances of tying that do not involve substantial tied market
foreclosure but may nonetheless facilitate price discrimination would
entail significant error costs. And, of course, attempts to constrain error
costs by identifying those relatively uncommon tie-ins that do not enhance static efficiency would create significant decision costs. To minimize the sum of decision and error costs, then, the Court should hold
that tie-ins not involving substantial tied market foreclosure are legal
even if they may facilitate price discrimination. Coupled with its consistent adherence to decision-theoretic principles, the Court's observation
in Independent Ink that price discrimination is common in competitive
markets suggests that the Court is headed in this direction.3 39
B. Loyalty Rebates
A loyalty rebate occurs when a seller grants a price cut on all units
a buyer has purchased from it, once the buyer purchases some speci-

336 See id. Even Elhauge, perhaps the leading academic defender of current tying doctrine, concedes that most metering tie-ins will increase output in the tying product market
and enhance total surplus. See id. at 433, 481.
3
See Klein & Wiley, supra note 180, at 612-15 (explaining why the static efficiency effects of metering price discrimination are likely to be positive).
8 Id. at 615-19 (explaining why metering price discrimination is likely to promote
dynamic efficiency).
33 See infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
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fied quantity of units.340 Frequently, the quantity requirement is set
forth in terms of a percentage of the buyer's requirements. 3 41 Because
they involve price cuts, loyalty rebates always provide consumer benefit
in the short run.34 2 One might thus expect them to be evaluated under
the straightforward standards articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's
1993 decision, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.343
Some scholars have argued, though, that loyalty rebates may occasion
anticompetitive harm even if they result in above-cost pricing.3 " Accordingly, those scholars contend, they should be evaluated under a
more nuanced liability rule. 345
The harm these scholars predict occurs when the discount at issue
enables the discounter to usurp so much business from its rivals that
their output drops below minimum efficient scale. 346 Assume, for example, that a market consists of two brands, that the current market
share of the brands, which reflects consumer demand, is 60% for the
dominant brand and 40% for its nondominant rival. Assume also that
the product at issue costs each manufacturer $.90 per unit to produce,
that it is sold by each to retailers for $1 per unit, and that minimum
efficient scale in this market occurs at a level of production equal to
35% of market demand. Suppose, then, that the dominant manufacturer offers retailers a 10% loyalty rebate on all purchases ever made if
they buy 70% of their requirements from that manufacturer. The $0.90
per unit discounted price is not below the dominant manufacturer's
cost and thus would not run afoul of Brooke Group.
Such a loyalty rebate, however, could cause anticompetitive harm
by driving an equally efficient rival from the market.3 4 7 That is because
the non-dominant rival could avoid losing market share and thus fal340

See U.S.

341

See id.

DEP'T OFJUSTICE,

supra note 333, at 106.

342 See

id.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24
(1993) (establishing a standard of illegality only where the discounted per unit price is
below cost and there is a likelihood of recoupment via supracompetitive pricing).
34 See Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory PricingRules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?,
2006 UTAH L. REv. 863, 865; Willard K. Tom et al., Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share
Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 627 (2000). See
generally U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 333, at 107 (summarizing potential anticompetitive effects of loyalty rebates).
3
See Lande, supra note 344, at 882-83; Tom et al., supra note 344, at 638.
36 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 333, at 107; AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169,
1 749b (recognizing that there may be situations in which an above-cost single-product
discount "increases the dominant firm's sales so much that it denies rivals economies of
scale because they cannot get their own output high enough").
4 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 333, at 107.
3
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ling below minimum efficient scale only if it matched the full dollar
amount of the dominant brand's discount on its smaller base of sales. 348
Such a smaller producer, however, would not be able to match without
pricing below its cost.349
Given the potential for this sort of scenario, a number of commentators have argued that Brooke Group's safe harbor for above-cost discounts should not apply to loyalty rebates. 35 0 For example, during their
time at the Federal Trade Commission, Willard Tom, David Balto, and
Neil Averitt asserted that "the cost test of predatory pricing does not
automatically apply" to loyalty rebates. 35 1 Instead, they maintained,
"one must conduct a case-by-case analysis of the actual effects of the
particular practice to determine whether anticompetitive outcomes are
likely. "352
From the standpoint of decision theory, though, straightforward
application of the Brooke Group safe harbor for loyalty rebates that result
in above-cost prices is a far wiser course. As an initial matter, any rival that
is as efficient as the discounter and engages in aggressive price competition from the outset can avoid being foreclosed by a loyalty rebate that
does not result in below-cost discounted prices. 353 All it must do is maintain its price at or near the level of its marginal cost.3 54

See id.
Consider, for example, a typical retailer that initially (before the rebate announcement) satisfied its requirements by purchasing sixty units of the dominant brand for $60
and forty units of the rival for $40. After implementation of the rebate plan, the retailer
could meet its requirements by spending $63 to obtain seventy units of the dominant
brand and $30 to obtain thirty units of the rival's brand. In order to prevent a loss of market share that would drive it below minimum efficient scale, the nondominant manufacturer would need to match the dominant seller's $7 discount. But to do so, it would have
to lower its $1 per-unit price by 17.5 cents ($.175 * 40 = $7.00), which would require it to
price below its cost of $.90 per unit.
s5o See Lande, supra note 344, at 869, 882-83; Tom et al., supra note 344, at 638.
s5 Tom et al., supra note 344, at 638. When their article was published, Tom, Balto,
and Averitt were, respectively, the deputy director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, the
bureau's assistant director for policy and evaluation, and an attorney within the bureau. Id.
at 615.
352 Id. at 638.
35 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 841, 845-49.
As Hovenkamp explains:
3

3

[W]hen a discount is offered on a single product (whether a quantity or market share discount) the discount should be lawful if the price, after all discounts are taken into account, exceeds the defendant's marginal cost or average variable cost because such discounts are covered by antitrust's ordinary
predatory pricing rule. One of the factors driving the predatory pricing rule
is that, as long as prices are above the relevant measure of cost, the discounts
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Moreover, the sort of case-by-case analysis urged by those who hypothesize instances of anticompetitive loyalty rebates would involve extremely high decision and error costs. Such an approach would require
a court to ascertain minimum efficient scale within a market and to determine whether the discount at issue would tend to drive the output of
rivals below that level.355 Such determinations are extremely difficult to
make, requiring extensive discovery and expert testimony.356 False convictions would be inevitable, and businesses that anticipated such errors
and possible treble damage awards would be discouraged from giving
any rebates that might be subject to challenge.3 57 Consumer welfare
would suffer.
cannot exclude an equally efficient rival. The same is true of single product
discounts.
Id. at 844.
64 In the hypothetical above, for example, the dominant firm's discounted price, $.90
per unit, was equal to both firms' cost of production. Had the nondominant rival charged
that price prior to implementation of the dominant firm's loyalty rebate, it likely would
have grown its market share to a point at which its rival's loyalty rebate strategy could not
drive it below minimum efficient scale. Moreover, a strategy that would prevent a nondominant but equally efficient firm from being harmed by a dominant rival's above-cost loyalty rebate would be for the non-dominant firm to give its own loyalty (i.e., volume) discounts from the outset, securing up-front commitments from enough buyers (in exchange
for discounted prices) to ensure that its production stayed above minimum efficient scale.
Such a strategy, which would obviously benefit consumers, would be encouraged by a rule
that evaluated loyalty rebates under straightforward Brooke Group principles and thereby
signaled to manufacturers that they must take steps to protect themselves from above-cost
loyalty rebates. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-24. In the end, then, any equally efficient
rival that is committed to engaging in vigorous price competition ought not to be excluded by a dominant seller's above-cost loyalty rebate.
35 Hovenkamp, supra note 353, at 843.
56 See id. (observing that the approach would "make impossible informational demands on courts").
37 Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1688, 1709-10
(2005). As the author has explained elsewhere:
The problem with this open-ended approach, of course, is that it offers virtually no guidance to businesses. In practice, it would require antitrust counselors to predict whether a judge (or, worse yet, a jury) would conclude that an
above-cost purchase target discount was merely "competition on the merits"
or was likely to be so successful (i.e., to win so much business from rivals) that
it would harm competition by reducing rivals' efficiencies. The crystal ball nature of this inquiry, coupled with the fact that a mistaken prediction could result in treble damages, would likely overdeter by chilling many proconsumer
discounts.
Id; see also Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253,
266-67 (2003) ("These sorts of risks [created by open-ended liability rules] cannot help
but chill investments to create product offerings with a sufficient quality or cost advantage
over preexisting market options .. . .").
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In a challenge to loyalty rebates, then, the Roberts Court would
confront several considerations relevant to a decision-theoretic analysis.
First, an above-cost loyalty rebate is unlikely to foreclose or impair the
efficiency of any equally efficient rival that engages in aggressive price
competition. Second, any anticompetitive harm that does result is likely
to self correct as supracompetitive pricing attracts new entrants into the
market. Third, efforts to capture any stray instances of such harm would
be costly to administer and would likely chill procompetitive price reductions. In light of those considerations, the approach that would
cause the least harm and minimize the sum of decision and error costs
would be to evaluate loyalty rebates under straightforward Brooke Group
principles, immunizing those rebates that result in above-cost prices.
That is the tack the Roberts Court would likely take on loyalty rebates.
C. Bundled Discounts
Like loyalty rebates, bundled discounts are conditional price
cuts. 358 They occur when a seller offers discounts on the condition that
buyers purchase from the seller multiple products from different product markets. 35 9 They, too, generally provide immediate consumer benefit, so courts should use caution regulating them. 360 But bundled discounts differ from loyalty rebates in that they do have the potential to
exclude equally efficient, aggressive rivals, even if they result in abovecost prices. Nonetheless, decision theory suggests there should be a
price-cost safe harbor for bundled discounts.
As a number of courts and commentators have explained, a bundled discount that results in an above-cost price for the bundle may exclude from the market an equally efficient rival that does not produce
as diverse a product line as the discounter. Such a rival would have to
match the entire dollar value of the bundled discount on its less extenSee Lambert, supra note 357, at 1689.
s5 See id.
3oo See id. at 1698. Einer Elhauge has argued that bundled discounts need not provide
any consumer benefit at all. See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 450-51. He hypothesizes a situation in which the seller first raises the unbundled price above the amount it would charge
absent the discount (i.e., above the "but for" price) and then "discounts" the bundle to a
price at or above the aggregate price that would have prevailed absent the bundled discount scheme. See id. Although such phony discounts are theoretically possible, Elhauge
points to no empirical evidence suggesting that they are common (or that they exist at all
in the real world). See id. As the author has argued elsewhere, the sort of phony discount
that so worries Elhauge would be relatively easy to identify, so courts could exempt them
from any generally prevailing approach to evaluating bundled discounts. See Lambert,
supra note 357, at 1753-55.
3-1
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sive product line.361 The classic example of the problem involves a
bundled discount on shampoo and conditioner.36 2 Suppose that manufacturer A sells both shampoo and conditioner, is a monopolist in the
conditioner market, and competes in the shampoo market against
manufacturer B, which sells only shampoo. B is the more efficient
shampoo manufacturer, producing shampoo at a cost of $1.25 per bottle compared to A's cost of $1.50 per bottle. A's cost of producing a bottle of conditioner is $2.50. If purchased separately, A's per-bottle prices
for shampoo and conditioner are $2.00 and $4.00, respectively. But A
offers customers a $1.00 bundled discount, charging only $5.00 for the
shampoo/conditioner package.
Although this discounted price is still above A's cost for the bundle
($4.00), it could tend to exclude B. Assuming that shampoo buyers
must also buy conditioner (in equal proportions), buyers would have to
pay A's unbundled conditioner price of $4.00 if they purchased B's
shampoo and would thus be unwilling to pay more than $1.00 for the B
brand of shampoo. That price, though, is below B's $1.25 cost. Thus,
A's bundled discount would tend to exclude B from the market even
though the discounted price ($5.00) is above A's aggregate cost for the
bundle ($4.00) and B is the more efficient shampoo producer.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized in 2003
in LePage's Inc. v. 3M that a bundled discount "when offered by a monopolist ... may foreclose portions of the market to a potential com-

petitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group of products
and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer."3 63 Sitting en banc,
the court famously condemned a bundled discount program by defendant 3M using this reasoning.3 6 The court upheld a $68 million antitrust judgment in favor of 3M's rival, LePage's, even though the discounted prices 3M offered were above its costs and LePage's conceded
that it was a less efficient producer of the products it sold in competition
with 3M.365 The court's evaluative approach was hardly a model of clarity

361See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc.
v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Supra
note 333, at 96; Lambert, supra note 357, at 1695-96.
362 See Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 467 (setting forth a version of the hypothetical presented
in the text above, albeit with slightly altered price and cost data).
363 LePage's, 324 F.3d at 155.
3 Id. at 155-57.
365 Id. at 157, 177 (GreenbergJ., dissenting).
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and included no safe harbors for sellers contemplating bundled discount offers.366 Not surprisingly, the business community was aghast.367
In contrast to the Third Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has crafted a clear safe harbor for certain bundled discounts. In 2008's Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,the Ninth Circuit adopted a safe harbor based on a "discount attribution" test.3m
Under that court's approach, liability will not arise when a bundled discount results in above-cost pricing of a competitive product after the
entire amount of the discount is attributed to that product.3 69 If a bundled discount passes muster under that test, then any equally efficient
single-product seller of the competitive product could match the discount. The only sellers that would lose sales because of that discount
would be either those less efficient than the bundled discounter, or
those unwilling to lower price to the level of cost. Competition is not
harmed when rivals that are less efficient or less willing to compete are
excluded from the market.
Compared to the Third Circuit's amorphous approach, the Ninth
Circuit's approach reduces error costs by eliminating the potential for
liability based on discounts that could not impair competition.3 70
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's approach imposes relatively low decision
costs on business planners, for, as the PeaceHealth court observed, "[a]
seller can easily ascertain its own prices and costs of production and
calculate whether its discounting practices run afoul of the rule we
have outlined."37 1
366 See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1720-21 (parsing the reasoning of the LePage's decision to discern the court's evaluative approach). The LePage's court appeared to hold that
(1) bundled discounts are presumptively exclusionary if the discounter is bundling products not sold by its rivals and is winning business from those rivals, but (2) the presumption may be rebutted if the discounter proves a "business reasons justification" for the
bundled discounts, meaning that the bundling saves costs approaching the amount of the
total discount. See id.
367 See Mike Meyers, One Big, Sticky Mess, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 10, 2003, at
D1 ("[C]ompanies nationwide are glued to the case."). The following businesses and trade
groups joined amicus briefs asking the Supreme Court to reverse the decision: BellSouth
Corp.; Boeing Co.; Brunswick Corp.; the Business Roundtable; Caterpillar Inc.; the CocaCola Co.; Eastman Kodak Co.; Honeywell International Inc.; Hormel Foods Corp.; Intel
Corp.; Johnson & Johnson, Inc.; Kimberly-Clark Corp.; Morgan Stanley; the National Association of Manufacturers; Nokia Inc.; Northwest Airlines, Inc.; the Procter & Gamble Co.;
Schering-Plough Corp.; Staples, Inc.; Verizon Communications; and Xerox Corp. See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1690 n.7.
3- 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008).
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 907.
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From a decision-theoretic perspective, then, the Ninth Circuit's
approach to evaluating bundled discounts is far superior to that followed by the Third Circuit. At a minimum, the Roberts Court, if it decides to resolve the current circuit split on how to evaluate bundled
discounts, will likely endorse the discount attribution safe harbor. It
may go further, immunizing bundled discounts that result in an abovecost price for the bundle itself, or requiring a plaintiff to prove either
below-cost pricing of the entire bundle or its equivalent efficiency and
likelihood of exclusion.3 72 The downside of the former approach is that
it may create significant error costs from false negatives because of the
fact that above-cost bundled discounts may exclude efficient, competitive rivals.373 The downside of the latter approach is that it imposes high
decision costs on courts as well as business planners, who must estimate
their rivals' efficiencies.3 74 Either approach may optimally minimize the
sum of decision and error costs, and the Roberts Court would certainly
take a hard look at both.375 The author has elsewhere suggested an alternative approach that avoids both difficulties and would keep decision and error costs in check.37 6 Certainly the author would be pleased
if the Court were to adopt the proposal. This Article's focus, though, is
prediction, and the Article predicts with confidence that the Roberts
Court, if called upon to prescribe a liability rule for bundled discounts,
will, at a minimum, provide a safe harbor for discounts that are abovecost under the discount attribution test.
CONCLUSION

Judge Harold Leventhal famously compared examinations of legislative history to looking across a crowded room in search of one's
friends; in both inquiries, one is sure to find what one is looking for.377
372 See id. at 904-05; Lambert, supra note 357, at 1700-05. This is the so-called "aggregate discount" rule. See PeaceHealth,515 F.3d at 904-05; Lambert, supra note 357, at 170005. Herbert Hovenkamp endorses this approach, on decision-theoretic grounds, in his
own scholarship, although not in his Antitrust Law treatise. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2,
at 172-73. This is the approach endorsed by the Ortho court. See Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 469.
s7 See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1705 (describing potential error costs of aggregate
discount approach).
374 See id. at 1729-30 (describing the high administrative costs of the Ortho rule).
3
See Lambert, supra note 264, at 175-77 (explaining how discount aggregation rule,
although potentially underdeterrent, may nonetheless be optimal from the standpoint of
decision theory).
376 See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1739-53.
3
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Tenn, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (recounting Judge Leventhal's observation
about legislative history).
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The same can no doubt be said of endeavors to analyze the jurisprudence of a "Court" that begins in a somewhat arbitrary fashion upon a
new chief justice's confirmation and that is also constantly changing.
When it comes to the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions, scholars sympathetic to the Chicago School have discerned trends reflective of that
school's insights and methodologies.3 78 Scholars associated with the
Harvard School have done the same.379 The trend identified in this Article, a recognition of the limits of antitrust and a consequent effort to
structure liability rules so as to minimize the sum of decision and error
costs, is an old friend of mine.3 80 Accordingly, I cannot rule out the possibility that I have seen in these decisions just what I wanted to see. The
degree to which the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions often quite explicitly comport with decision theory's insights is striking, however.
In any event, this Article's analysis has debunked the oft-heard
characterization of the Roberts Court's antitrust jurisprudence as being
reflexively pro-business, anti-consumer, and "radical." That meme is
overly simplistic and betrays both a severe naivety about the inherent
limits of the antitrust enterprise and a misunderstanding of the intentionally evolutionary nature of antitrust doctrine. In light of antitrust's
limits, which must be respected if the body of law is to provide maximum long-term benefit to consumers, the Roberts Court's antitrust decisions, although generally rendering antitrust a more "modest" enterprise, have moved the law in a salutary direction.

See Wright, supra note 1, at 26.
See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 60.
3
See Lambert, supra note 56, at 224; Lambert, supra note 45, at 2004-05. This approach is sometimes called a "Neo-Chicago" approach. See Daniel Crane, Chicago, PostChicago, Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CH. L. REv. 1911, 1932-33 (2009) (describing a "Neo-Chicago"
approach that would "rearticulat[e] [the Chicago School's] second article of faith," by
emphasizing that "competitive practices that cause harm cannot be controlled without
doing damage to similar competitive practices that do good" and that "the good that
would be chilled through aggressive antitrust enforcement is often greater than the bad
that would be prevented"); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, DesigningAntitrust Rules for
Assessing UnilateralPractices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 85 (2005) (setting forth an error cost approach to crafting rules governing unilateral practices).
Note, though, that some scholars have disputed whether there is a real difference between the Neo-Chicago approach and the traditional Chicago School approach as emphasized by such lions of the Chicago School as Judge Easterbrook. See Josh Wright, NeoChicago Meets Evidence-Based Antitrust, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (May 12, 2009), http://
truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/12/neo-chicago-meets-evidence-based-antitrust/.
378
3
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